EPISTEMOLOGY AND EXPERIENCE.

We are never sure in philosophy just where we are going to be tripped up on our postulates, but, on the whole, it is probably safe to assume that there is such a thing as a knowing experience, and that this experience may be objective in the Kantian sense of the word, that it may present features, namely, which mark it off clearly from other experiences which we call subjective. Knowing is thus a process within experience, and for the present we may waive the question whether we ought to go on and ask whose experience this is. We are able to do this for the reason that each philosopher can philosophize only on the basis of a single experience, which for him is a unity, and so he naturally comes to speak of experience in general, without specifying what experience he means; and he can be intelligible because each of his hearers, too, has his own unity of experience, which for him again is experience pure and simple.

Taking, then, experience, which for the philosopher is one, we find that it breaks up for thought into a great variety of elements. There is, indeed, nothing whatever belonging to experience which cannot thus be made an object of thought. And we soon find that there are certain typical forms of thought, certain rubrics under which the world of experience gets placed, and which, indeed, constitute its objectivity as a world. But we are still, it is to be noticed, strictly within experience; nothing external or transcendent has yet been taken into account. Moreover, these categories, we find, do not arise in a merely haphazard way, but each has its place fixed with reference to the whole process of experience in which it arises. It ought to be possible, therefore, to introduce order among these forms of thought; and, instead of taking each isolatedly, and on the credentials with which it first presents itself to us, to define it with reference to the one process from which it springs, and so with reference to all its fellow categories. This is the work which Hegel undertook to do.

Now, if the problem, as it has just been stated, is the ultimate
one for philosophy, there can hardly be said to be any longer a
place for epistemology in the more common meaning of the
term. When we have assumed the knowing process as a fact—
and we can hardly avoid doing this—the question, 'How is knowl-
edge possible?' ceases to possess much interest. If it is actual,
why should we concern ourselves about its possibility? The real
center of interest now lies in its nature and function. If, indeed,
knowledge referred to something outside experience, then the
question as to how such a transcendence could be rendered con-
ceivable, would be very much to the point; but the recognition
that we are dealing with a process entirely within experience,
and having its value with reference to experience, puts the whole
problem out of court.

But now if we do examine more closely the function of knowl-
edge, we are led, I think, a step beyond Hegel's position, with-
out, however, giving up his fundamental presuppositions—to the
recognition, namely, that within experience knowledge is not an
ultimate resting place, but that it has its value with reference to
something beyond itself, to action. It is this thought which Profes-
sor Dewey has worked out in a convincing way, and without going
into the details of his reasoning, I may briefly state his position:
So long as activity is unimpeded, we have what is in itself neither
subjective nor objective, but just a bit of experience. But let us
suppose that there comes a break in activity, and we are brought
to a standstill. Now, in the first place, this brings to consciousness
the value of the activity; and that value, if it is sufficiently great,
is projected as an end. The end or ideal thus grows out of what
we are already doing. The real, on the other hand, the object,
is that which can be utilized as a means to reach this end. It
represents past ends, the organization of past experience, which
is real, in that it is there to be utilized, and so can be taken for
granted, but which is yet not sufficiently real to function, to
overcome the break, and so has to be made over. Over against
this, the end, the idea, the concept, is projected as ideal; but the
two, the real and the ideal, the particular and the universal, are
entirely relative to one another, since both grow out of the
break in experience, and have for their purpose to overcome this
break. The object is the means to be used, the concept is the method for controlling the means; and it is the interaction between the two, by which they mutually define each other, and which is represented in the types of judgment, that finally issues in the reconstruction of activity in a more complete way. Reality, therefore, is neither the given of sense, nor the concept, but is the living activity of growth in experience, for whose reconstruction object and idea both have their functional part to play.

This is, of course, not a proof of Professor Dewey's theory, nor even, I am afraid, a very intelligible statement of it, but perhaps it will serve for the present purpose. And I find myself very largely in agreement with it, so that in fact it will form the basis of what I am going to say. It seems to me undeniable that thought is relative to growth in experience, to activity. But have we really exhausted the problem of philosophy, when we confine it to what, in this somewhat vague way, has been called experience? That there is no reality for us which does not bear directly on the value of life, I am ready to admit, and I think the admission is of great philosophical importance. But is it not possible that the existence of realities beyond anything that we in this immediate and undefined way can call experience has a very definite meaning for activity itself? This will depend somewhat on what we mean by activity. If we mean overt action in the bare sense and nothing more, then thought remains outside the action to which it leads. Knowledge, on this showing, is simply a method which puts the means of physical livelihood more completely within our control, and life approximates to a consciousness of physical actions. But if this is not the whole of life—and probably no one would assert that it is—the question arises, whether there is not involved in the larger meaning that is given to activity, precisely the reference to realities lying beyond it, and not simply beyond in the past and future, but existing contemporaneously with it. Social and religious experience certainly seems to me to involve that the experience stands in relation to larger realities, which are not itself, although they are represented within it, and are essential to its value. The grief of my friend is in a way an element in experience such as I can speak
of as a unity; but it ceases to have meaning, if it is exhausted in the part it plays in that experience, and has not also a reality of its own, which can never enter into this unity of experience directly. So in the religious consciousness, the meaning of an activity comes out, only as that activity takes up into itself the value of its place as an element in a reality which immeasurably transcends it. Accordingly, we seem justified in recognizing a possible distinction between thought as a tool for reconstructing our experience, and knowledge, or external reference, as an element in the immediate value of reconstructed experience itself. I shall return to this again; at present, it is enough to point out that, if the distinction be admitted, the problem as to how this external reference is possible, the problem, namely, of epistemology, there-upon reappears again.

The same result seems to emerge in a different way. We have been talking about the characteristics of experience, on the assumption that we know approximately what we are talking about. But we cannot talk about the experience which we are now actually undergoing; we can only experience it. To talk of past experience involves two things: it involves that there is a present experience, and that this experience has a meaning that transcends itself. The past experience must be regarded as at one time a reality, not as a mere functional aspect of our present thought, or else I do not see but that our philosophizing leaves us in mid-air; but if a reality, it is a reality beyond the experience which is now in question, and which knows it. We are able, that is, to mean in experience a reality which is not, as a fact of existence, the experience in which this meaning plays a functional part; the experience as a meaning, and the experience which is meant, are existentially not the same. For, of course, I admit that the memory is not exhausted in its past reference, and that it never would arise unless the past had a value for some present use. I maintain only that there are both these aspects, that the memory has a value for the present, but that it can have this value only as it takes us out of the present to a reality which, in point of existence, lies beyond the knowing experience. And this again brings up the whole problem of epistemology, how
such a transcendence is possible. And if it is possible here, if memory of a past real experience is a fact, is there in principle any difficulty in admitting, if it seems demanded, that, through an experience of our own, we may know a reality which exists beyond any experience that we can interpret as a unity, the separate reality of another man's experience, or even the reality of the external world?

Suppose I pass the judgment: 'This tree has fruit on it.' Now a statement, which would appeal to ordinary common sense, of what is involved in this judgment, would run, I think, something as follows: There is a fact in the world of reality, a tree with fruit upon it, existing quite apart from my process of judgment. This reality is brought home to me in some way through sense perception, and by a subjective process I qualify my knowledge of the tree by the further circumstance that it bears fruit, always with the understanding that the quality of fruit-bearing belongs to the real tree, not to my idea of it, and that the change has been a change in my knowledge, not a change in the reality known. But now difficulties may be raised about this. It would seem, on such a statement, that the real subject of which we assert the quality, lies wholly outside the judging experience, and that what we have within the judgment is only a copy or representation of this. But if we never can get hold of the original, how are we to compare the copy with it to know that it is true? or how can we even know it is a copy? Furthermore, to raise a question of fact, is it true that in judging we do actually think of two things, an original and a copy? If, however, we do not put the real beyond the judging experience, and make our judgment merely a subjective knowledge about it, we are involved in other difficulties. If the subject within experience is the real, the relation of the predicate to it is ambiguous. If the judgment is to be true, the predicate must belong to the subject already, and then our judgment is simply analytic, i.e., tautologous. And if it does not belong to the subject already, we have changed the subject by adding to it, and our judgment is false. Then there is the whole question as to how the predicate, which is ideal, gets itself attached to the real subject, how the ideal and the real can come
together. And if, as it is possible to do with good show of reason, we claim that the subject itself is ideal, that it is constituted by thought relations, we have at least to ask how the apparent difference comes about, while the whole set of difficulties that attaches to the notion of thought as reality comes at once to the front.

These last difficulties have already had an answer suggested in the theory of Professor Dewey. The real and the ideal emerge only with reference to each other, and both have their justification through the part they play in the reorganization of experience. And, from the same standpoint, the difficulty about the possibility of a synthetic judgment also receives an answer. We were stopped from saying that the predicate adds something to the subject, by the recognition that the process of judgment would thus bring about a change in the real. But why may this not be the very function of judgment? Indeed, if reality is experience, then judgment undoubtedly does change the real; it is the process by which there is effected a growth in experience, and so a growth in reality.

Grant then that the standpoint which the theory represents is a final one, and we must admit that judgment effects an actual change, a reconstruction of reality. For the reasons which have already been suggested, however, I do not find it possible to stop with this; and I certainly do not think it represents an opinion which commends itself to the natural man. It is, I feel sure, an essential element in our ordinary conception of the judgment, that it does not change the reality about which the judgment is made, but that this reality must already have been there complete, in order for the judgment to be true. And so, again, if we reject this, and still are to save the judgment from tautology and uselessness, we shall have to distinguish between the judging process, which is a growth, and the reality about which the judgment is made, a reality beyond the judging process itself, as well as beyond the new experience to which the judging process leads up. Is it possible now to retain this standpoint, and yet give due weight to the objections which have been raised?

We are familiar nowadays with the thought that in the predi-
cate of the judgment we have meaning which is divorced from existence. Now in a similar, though not an identical way, I think that we must recognize in the subject also a divorce between meaning and existence. We have, that is, a perception, the sight of an object, as a fact within experience; but as the particular image is lost sight of in its conceptual use, so the sense perception as an element of experience loses itself in its reference to a reality beyond experience—the real object. There is nothing in this, to repeat, which we are not in principle compelled to admit in the case of memory. The memory is itself an experience, an existence, but at the time it is not thought of as an experience; it loses itself in the past experience which is remembered. By the object of perception accordingly, we should not mean any phase whatever of an experience such as in any sense we can call our own, though our seeing the object can be explained psychologically only by reference to such an experience; but, instead, an abiding reality which existed before we saw it, had its own existence as we continued to look at it, and was quite unaffected when we turned our eyes away. And so far as the facts of ordinary interpretation go, this is exactly what we do mean.

But now a difficulty may suggest itself. There certainly is a difference between subjective and objective experience, or we should not all the time be talking about it; and yet, on this showing, all experience whatsoever of which I can take immediate account is subjective, that is, it is merely mine. But how can an objective experience be subjective at the same time? Or, to put it in another way, if one particular kind of experience is subjective, how can all experience whatever be subjective also? I think that we can answer this by taking note of a distinction. We must distinguish, that is, between experience as it is, and experience as it is for knowledge. Immediate activity as such is felt neither as objective nor as subjective; it is experience pure and simple. It is only when activity is checked, that the kind of experience which we call objective or subjective arises in the form of the knowing or judging process. Now thought itself is, of course, an activity, but it is a sort of activity which involves a reference to a reality beyond. That reality may be an experience which is
connected in a more or less continuous way with the knowing experience itself; and then we say that the knowing experience is subjective. Or it may be a reality which has never directly been an experience of our own, as in perception, and then the knowing experience is objective. But the point to be noticed is that the sort of experience which we denominate subjective or objective, in the sense in which these terms are opposed to each other as marking distinctions in experience, is a thought or judging experience, an experience which is employed in working out the solution of some difficulty, rather than the consciousness of an immediate and unimpeded activity. But this very distinction implies a second difference, the difference, namely, between the set of experiences which our thought recognizes as having a certain continuity with itself, and which we call ours, and the reality which thought recognizes as never having formed part directly of the continuous unity of our own conscious life. Accordingly, in a somewhat different sense, we can apply the term subjective to all experience whatever that comes to us, meaning not that it has the peculiar differentia of subjectivity actually going along with it (it may have this or it may not), but simply that it has a certain unity of its own such that we can call it ours, without thereby supposing that it exhausts the sum total of reality.

If this analysis is correct, it follows that there is no insuperable difficulty in the fact that we are not conscious in perception of two things, an original and a copy. The object as reality, and the object as my subjective apprehension of reality, are not one experience but two; they depend upon two distinct acts of thought. The process, on the view I have been taking, would be as follows: In the original naïve perception (as subsequent reflection informs us) there is a fact of experience, the perception of an object, whose function, however, it is to lose its character as a part of experience in its meaning, its reference to a reality which is not within our experience at all, but which can be utilized for the furthering of our own ends. But on this very account, it does not exist for naïve perception in the former sense, but only in its meaning, as a real thing. Moreover, naïve perception cannot even say 'a reality beyond experience,' for such a
phrase would imply the second thought process as already performed, by which we recognize the existence of experience as such. The naive man can only say 'real thing.' But when we have once recognized the experience of seeing the object as a reality, then common sense has no hesitation in saying that this is not the whole fact, and that the reality which is seen has an existence of its own beyond experience. The (properly) subjective thought experience by which we recognize a previous experience as our own, tells us at the same time that our meaning in that experience was something, not a part of experience, but outside of it; not in the sense that we must have had a direct consciousness of this at the time, but in the sense of telling us something new about the previous experience, which we recognize as consonant with the experience itself. It may very well be that for ordinary purposes this knowledge plays no immediate part in our consciousness. We may continue in the path of naive perception, and let the object simply perform its function in our activity, without distinctly recognizing its separateness from our own conscious life, unless our attention is directly called to it. But again, and especially in so far as the world of reality enters into our religious consciousness, just this recognition may be of the profoundest value. The stars are undoubtedly excellent guides for the sailor, and they may serve indifferently to light us home on a dark night, and for our ordinary consciousness this reference to practical activities may be enough. But who does not feel that Kant, as with immeasurable awe he gazes into the starry heavens, represents a truth of experience which also has its value, and which we could ill afford to lose?

And now I think we are perhaps in a position to give some sort of answer to the objection that our original never can be gotten hold of to compare with the copy. We certainly cannot, and do not, reason from an original to a copy; but I do not see any inherent absurdity in supposing that the nature of knowledge is precisely such that certain elements of our experience come to us originally with the claim that they represent a reality beyond, a claim which we simply have to accept as an ultimate datum. And I see the less reason to deny this, since a claim which is es-
sentially similar is admitted by nearly all philosophers. It is supposed that memory somehow gives us a hold on real past experience, but that our experience when we remember, is not the experience which we remember. We have, that is, in memory, an experience which professes to take us beyond itself, to mean a reality which is quite other than its own reality. But here also it may just as well be asked: 'How do we know that memory truly represents the past, since we cannot get at the past to compare it?' And the answer is: 'Certainly we cannot demonstrate it, we simply take it on trust.' On the assumption that memory in general is to be relied on, we may erect a practical test for this or that memory. It is true, if, when we act on it, it sufficiently serves our purpose. If, on the contrary, it brings us into conflict with the rest of reality, the presumption is that it is false. But because we find that some memories do play us false, we do not thereupon at once doubt memory altogether; we assume in each case that the claims of memory are true, and doubt only when we have some reason to doubt. There is, however, no possible way of proving that memory as such presents true claims, apart from the fact that the claim is made, and that, on the whole, there is no reason which compels us to discredit it. Now I do not see that the case is very much different in perception. It would be foolish to insist much on the fact that the past experience which memory recalls was once our experience; the important thing is that at least the past experience is not here now. And in the case of perception again, whether this particular perception truly represents reality or not, it is possible, assuming that perception on the whole is what it claims to be, to submit to the practical test of action; that perception in general is justified in its claims, we cannot possibly demonstrate. But, on the other hand, if the claim is made, the balance of proof lies with him who denies it.

Perhaps it will be well before going further to sum up now in a general way the criticism of experience contained in the foregoing pages. The assertion that reality is experience, and that all the categories of reality are distinctions within the process of experience, may be said, I think, to represent the fundamental thought of that whole philosophical standpoint which in the
broad sense may be termed Hegelian. Now I am also willing to say that there is no reality which is not experience, but I should like to define the terms a little more exactly. For experience, without further qualification, is a pure concept, which has no more place in the world of reality than any other concept has. And it seems to me that the Hegelian tends to use experience in this abstract way. Accordingly it is not strange that the distinction between your experience, and mine, and the experience of God, should be difficult to define, for in experience as abstract no such distinction exists. The concept is not and does not pretend to be individual. I should maintain, on the contrary, that reality is definite, concrete experience; not experience, i.e., but experiences, such experiences as I can look back on and call my own. And with this the peculiar advantage which is claimed for the theory seems to me to disappear. What it is after is some larger whole within which the apparently isolated factors of self and not-self, God and the world, you and me, may be reconciled. And in experience this is what we seem to have; for it is in experience that all things come to us. But if experience falls apart into concrete experiences, we are as far from a unity as ever. The question now is how we are to get the experiences together. Admitting that the serial order of experience which I interpret as my own life is an inclusive unity, which undoubtedly in some sense it is, in what sense can we bring into a unity, experiences that are going on side by side? We might solve the difficulty by saying that only such experiences as we can actually succeed in bringing into a certain unity, that comparatively meagre string of them which I can think of as mine, are to be accounted real; but only at the expense of landing in solipsism, a solipsism none the less real, I think, because the experience contains among its elements other men as well as myself. And if we are not content with this, then I say that our transparent unity has broken down. A single experience may be such as contains myself, and other men, and God. A single experience, such at least as I know, can never be one that contains my experience, and other men's experience, and God's experience, as concrete realities. I think the distinction is a valid one. I myself, my neighbor, God, in so far as
they come within experience, are mere ideal points of reference; but the realities to which they point are concrete activities which do not merge in one. My neighbor, as a factor within a unity of experience, is not the concrete life of conscious experiencings which I mean by my neighbor; a part of these may indeed be represented within such a unity, but it is only a part, and only a representation. Just as soon, then, as we make experience concrete, we either have the one experience which I can call mine, or we have a host of experiences going on together, myself, my neighbor, millions of Indians and Chinamen, and, it may be, God. For, once started on this road, there is no limit to the reality one may be driven to admit, outside that reality which I can call experience for myself. And to say that all these experiences are brought together in the unity of experience, is either to make experience perfectly abstract, or else it is, so far as I can see, simply an act of philosophic faith.

If now the view which I have been trying to present has been made fairly clear, I should like to say a few words about its application to some of the difficulties which pertain to the relation between thought and reality, with especial reference to Mr. Bradley.

I think that a large part at least of the difficulties which Mr. Bradley finds in the thought-form may safely be admitted. But according to the theory of Professor Dewey, which is adopted here, thought is by no means the ultimate form of reality, even for us, but is distinctly a tool, not an end in itself. And the question accordingly is, whether there is any other form of experience accessible to us which satisfies the conditions more truly than does thought, or whether we shall have to take refuge in an unscrutable. To me there seems to be no insurmountable difficulty in supposing that what is in a real sense a type of absolute reality, is actually given in the form of conscious activity, that immediate experience where we do not have to ‘stop and think,’ and which has been described as neither subjective nor objective, in the ordinary sense of the terms as they are contrasted. Such an experience is not mere feeling; for we are perfectly aware of what we are doing and of the meaning of our act. It is not a
compound of things and of relations; for it is its very nature to be felt as a (for-the-time-being) perfect and transparent unity, with a definite value of its own, in which each element exists only as an expression of the activity as a whole. In other words, we get the true nature of reality in self consciousness, understood not as a thinking about oneself, but as a full and unimpeded flow of all our powers, in the clear consciousness of what we are about in all of its relations. I wish now to develop this a little more in detail.

The first difficulty which suggests itself may be disposed of briefly. It may be asked whether thought itself is not just as truly an activity as any experience can be, and, therefore, if it is not also real. I should say so, by all means. And thought, as an activity, is as free from contradictions, as truly a unity, as any activity is; it only presents contradictions, as it in turn is thought about. If it is borne in mind that the contradictions of thought are always in the object which is thought about, as an object of thought, and not in the thought activity as an immediate experience, I do not think the objection will be found serious.

But there is another question which seems at first sight to be a more puzzling one. If thought does not adequately represent reality, how, it may be asked, does it represent it at all, and what is our criterion for discounting its imperfections? The reality lies beyond thought, and yet for metaphysics thought is the only instrument we have for getting at it. Except as it is reached by thought, the reality vanishes as it ceases to be experienced; we might live it, but we could not philosophize about it. Since, however, thought is inadequate, how can we meet the demand of metaphysics that our thought be free from contradiction?

In order to get a clearer notion of the relation of thought to reality, I think it is necessary to make another distinction. It seems impossible to come to a clear understanding of what we mean by the reproduction of the real in thought, until we distinguish between thought as the process of judging still incomplete, and thought as the completed judgment. Now of the judgment process as an actual instrument for action a brief account has already been given, and it appeared that the subject represents the reality which we have at hand, a reality which is
unsatisfactory and so in need of change, but which, since it is all we have got, must be used as the means of its own reconstruction; and that the predicate, on the other hand, represents the end of action, which in the form of the concept serves as the method of reconstruction, the instrument by which the means are controlled, and the action is confined to the channels that will really satisfy the present need. So in the judgment, 'This tree has fruit on it,' the concept first of all is represented, we may say, by the interest connected with the need of satisfying the eating impulse, without which there is no reason why I should not just as well have judged, 'This tree has green leaves;' and, as this becomes defined, it takes the form of the concept 'fruit,' by which I am led not merely to look at the tree at large, but to hunt for certain definite characteristics. But now, according to Professor Dewey's theory, the judgment exists as a judgment only so long as the subject and predicate are in a certain amount of tension, so long as we have not yet found what we are after. When once they are brought together, and the judgment is made, we no longer have the judgment, but something quite different, viz., action. For instance, in the present case, I stop saying, 'This tree has fruit on it,' and go to eating. And in the case of our practical judgments there seems to be no doubt that this very frequently is true. But it also is very frequently not the case, and in scientific judgments it is even the exception. No doubt every judgment ultimately, if it is to be justified, must contribute to life; but the fact that it often does not pass at once into action, gives rise on the face of it to a certain problem. If the judgment ceases to be a judgment, and still fails to pass into action, how does it exist? As we certainly can complete a judgment, and in some way recognize this completion, without immediately acting upon it, our attitude in such a case calls for explanation.

The answer must, I think, recognize a quite distinct meaning of the word thought. More exactly, perhaps, we must recognize three meanings. First, there is thought in the sense of the judging process, where a tension still exists between the subject and predicate. Or, again, we may mean the ideal, the abstract ele-
ment within this process—the predicate or concept. In neither of these meanings can thought be said strictly to represent reality; for reality is concrete and is a unity, while it is the very essence of the judgment to hold things apart. But now we must recognize that this unity can be reached, not simply by overt acting, which intellectually is of no value, but also by acting in the ideal realm, by a purely intellectual representation of the act. Reality, that is, is conscious activity, and can be conceived as nothing else without contradiction. But it is the nature of thought, in these first two meanings, to take reality as static. It has to do this if it is not to commit suicide by having things change in its hands. And so long as we regard the real as actually static, so long as we hold that reality exists as it is for the process of thinking, I confess I do not see how the elements which it is the nature of thought to hold apart, and from one of which it passes to the other, can form any real unity, or how we can avoid taking refuge in an unknowable. But, if we hold that in conscious activity the unity is a real one, then thought can represent reality only as it ceases to hold its elements as fixed things, and passes over into a representation of concrete conscious action. Accordingly, here, I think, we have a third use of the term thought, in which it ceases to be abstract or relational, and becomes an ideal reproduction of the reality of action; a function which comes out most unambiguously, perhaps, in remembering an experience of our own. I start to pass the judgment, 'This tree has apples on it,' and when it is actually made, at once I go to eating. But in this activity, the tree and the apples and the relation between them do not necessarily pass from consciousness; they may cease to be external and separate, but, in so far as I am clearly conscious of what I am doing, they still exist as elements in my action, though as elements which enter indissolubly into the unity of my experience as a whole. Now my point is, that it is only as thought can reproduce to some extent such reality as this, that it can be said adequately to represent (not to be) reality, and that we actually get this third meaning of thought when a judgment is completed, and subject and predicate flow together in a unity.

Before applying this to external reality, it may be better to
consider it with reference to a past experience of our own, some definite experience in which I did not have to 'stop and think,' but in which there was present a clear consciousness of what I was about. Taking this simply as an experience, and not with reference to what it may imply for subsequent thought, it has a very decided unity and completeness of its own. But now if for any reason I want to think about it, I am compelled probably to construct it piecemeal, to split up into a number of elements what in the actual experience was united. And so long as I forget the original unity, I seem to have a lot of separate elements on my hands, held together in some way by relations. I can get back my unity only when I remember that this isolation is simply a thought device, and that the reality is not the isolated parts stuck together, but the active experience out of which the parts were differentiated.

In order to apply this to perception, it is only necessary to introduce again the factor which I have called the external reference, the reference to a reality which never by any possibility can be called a part of my experience. Admitting this reference in perception, how are we to say that the attribute 'red,' e. g., belongs to the rose? Essentially in the same way, I should answer, as that in which a red rose may enter into our own experience. Because we can have a unity of active experience in which all the relations of the elements within our consciousness are transparent to us through their connection with a comprehensive end, or at least can approximate such a unity, and because we can reproduce this ideally in memory, we are able to know the nature of absolute reality, provided, of course, that the reality which the world represents is a conscious experience. This is a very large assumption no doubt, and could be defended only by a complete metaphysic; but I think it is legitimate to use it as an hypothesis, if it is necessary in order to account for the apparent nature of our actual assumptions when we attempt to judge about reality. We get at the rose, it is true, not as an element in an absolute experience, but as a separate thing. Regarded as a separate thing, it can be connected only artificially with other things by means of relations, and the thought categories are simply the in-
struments, by which this analysis and the consequent synthesis which it makes necessary, are performed. But there is, we may suppose, a reality, a real experience, for which that world process whose elements we pick out and put together painfully and inadequately is a unity. Because we can ourselves act, and can realize the meaning of our act, we can know what, formally, the nature of the absolute reality is; in so far as, through our experience, we get at what we call the objective facts of the world, we are beginning to know the positive nature of this reality. That experience of the absolute into which the red rose enters, will not, of course, be just what my experience of the rose is. My activities are limited, and, for the most part, it is but a very few qualities of any object which enter as a constituent part into a single experience for me. That I should experience other qualities, as opposed to merely thinking of them in the form of a list, requires a second experience. But the more meaning we get into life, the more the objects which enter into our experience may become many-sided; and we can conceive of an activity in which the whole nature of an object should be exhausted.

We are consequently led to a conclusion which seems to me an important one, and it furnishes an answer to the difficulty as to the connection between the ideal and the real. For the distinction between the ideal and the real, the object and the concept, has validity only so long as the judgment is in process, and ceases when it is completed, when we actually get truth as opposed to the process of searching for it. The concept has existence only as a tool, a method. It is not any element of experience as an existence, but simply the way we use that particular element which we call the image. Accordingly, the concept, the universal as such, does not enter into reality at all except in its functional use. It is quite impossible that anything should exist in general. Nevertheless the concept always implies concrete reality back of it; it could serve no purpose in experience if it were not based on actual experience in the past. But now when the judgment is brought to a climax, the state of affairs is different. The red which I am using as a concept is one thing, and cannot form a part of concrete reality at all; the red which I actually
see in the rose, and which I must see in a single undivided experience before I can say finally, 'The rose is red,' is quite another. That red is a particular red, which, taken as an element in the experience of the red rose, has as true an existence as anything can have, not of course by itself, but simply as an element. The difficulty in recognizing this comes about partly by reason of the nature of language, and partly through the nature of thought itself. Language is made to serve the purposes of judgment, and all its words are universals. So we cannot say, 'The rose is red,' without having the rose and the quality red, each in itself a concept. And so, too, we cannot go through the thought process without separating and distinguishing; and the elements, as separate, are by that very fact abstract and unreal. But, as I have tried to show, thought to some extent overcomes its own fault; and by passing into a reproduction of concrete activity, it restores the unity which it had broken up. The process in judgment, therefore, is as follows: The subject of the judgment is that which we can take as given. It is such portion of reality as past activity has worked into our experience, so that we do not need to state its relations in detail. It involves, accordingly, just the same function of thought, as a representation of reality, which appears in the completion of the judgment, only that it represents reality less adequately. As I say, this function of thought can grow up psychologically only in connection with our past activities; but, since the same object enters into a great variety of experiences, it ceases to have a connection with any one in particular. The unity of the object, which can be taken for granted in perception, is therefore based simply on the possibility, from the psychological standpoint, of entering into experience in general. But since, for some reason, the object is unsatisfactory for our present purpose, we need to reconstruct it; and the concept, determined in each particular case by the end we then have in view, is our tool for doing this. But when the reconstruction is effected, and the judgment passed, we have not tacked on our concept to a reality which before was without it; we simply have been able, by means of the concept, to discover that an element which we had not recognized before in the unity of re-
a ity was really there; and this recognition of the already exist-
ing unity must precede, or, better, coincide with, the completion
of the judgment, not follow it. The proposition is simply a state-
ment of this recognition. How the quality could be there, we
understand again from the analogy of our own active experi-
ence. And if we still think of the quality as somehow requiring
to be fitted into its place, it is only because it is difficult alto-
gether to heal the wounds which analyzing thought has inflicted.
In reality the quality was there all along; but it was not, and is
not now there as a quality, for the semi-isolation which the word
suggests almost inevitably is in reality wholly fictitious.

A. K. Rogers.