Parmenides' Epistemology and the Two Parts of his Poem

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Abstract

This paper pursues a new approach to the problem of the relation between Aletheia and Doxa. It investigates as interrelated matters Parmenides' impetus for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to Doxa's investigations and to those in Aletheia, and the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. Parmenides, it is argued, maintained that Doxastic cognition is an ineluctable and even appropriate aspect of mortal life. The mortal agent, however, is nonetheless capable of sustaining the cognition of Aletheia by momentarily coming to think with—or as—his divine (fiery, aethereal) soul.

Keywords

Parmenides – Aletheia – Doxa – epistemology – soul

1 Introduction

We may distinguish three questions concerning the two parts of Parmenides' poem—Aletheia and Doxa. First, an 'aetiological question': Why did Parmenides write and include Doxa? Why is the second part there? Secondly, an 'epistemological question': What are the ways in which the mortal agent to...
whom the goddess speaks can think, and what are the ways in which he must think? To clarify, Alëtheia and Doxa discuss different kinds of objects what-is and Doxastic things respectively. Since Parmenides included both parts, he must consider thoughts about both kinds of object ultimately possible for the mortal agent. But is thought concerning any kind of object unavoidably necessary for the mortal? Does the mortal's ability to cognise a different kind of object then become a problem which requires an explanation? Thirdly, an 'ontological question': In the light of the doctrine of Alëtheia, what precisely is the status of Doxastic things? What is the nature of the relation between what-is and Doxastic things?

Those who addressed the aetiological question have generally considered one's view of it a consequence of one's position on the ontological question. Commentators have traditionally relegated Doxastic things to the status of mere appearances and, consequently, have typically minimised the significance of Parmenides' cosmology. Doxa was often reduced to a 'wholly dialectical' exercise; it became merely an 'exemplar... of all erroneous systems', or 'a case-study in self-deception, indecisiveness and confusion'; understood as the best-possible-but-still-false cosmology, it is sometimes taken to inoculate Parmenides against the temptations of cosmology as such. The scope and nature of Parmenides' cosmology, however, undermine such dialectical answers to the aetiological question. Both direct and indirect evidence indicates that Doxa comprised an extended and highly detailed exposition, thoroughly positive in tone, of diverse scientific theories, spanning, inter alia, universal cosmology (28 B12, A37 dK), cosmogony (B10-11), astronomy (B10-11; B14-15; A40a), geography (A44a; B15a), theogony (B13), anthropogony (dl 9.22), embryology (B18; A53-4) and human cognition (B16). Recent scholarship

1 By a 'Doxastic thing' I mean any item characterised by any of the attributes denied to what-is in B8, such as mobility or having-come-into-being, and which the theories advanced in Doxa take as their object (e.g. stars, people, embryos).

2 Owen 1960, 89, followed most recently by Cosgrove 2014, esp. 15-18, 25-6. (Cosgrove, though, does not think that Parmenides considers Doxastic things non-existent: 13, 17 n. 62, 24. Throughout, however, he nonetheless ascribes to Parmenides the view that no true accounts of Doxastic things and processes are possible; on Cosgrove see further discussion in this section, also n. 57 below.) Cf. also Tarân 1965, 227-8, 267; Furth 1974, 249.

3 Long 1975, 83.


6 Plutarch instructively rebukes Colotes for implausibly marginalising the sheer scope of Parmenides' cosmological inquiries and the thoroughness with which he pursued them.
has, moreover, produced a better appreciation of the involved, innovative and insightful nature of Parmenides' scientific inquiries. It strains credulity to suppose that, in developing such a systematic, ambitious and meticulously detailed cosmology, Parmenides was merely aiming to exemplify an entirely general metaphysical confusion. Nor is it clear what the dialectical or inoculative benefit consists in. By elaborating a particular, concrete theory concerning, say, the source of the moon's light (B14-15; A42) or the embryological processes by which children become similar to one parent or the other (A54), and adding thereby nothing to Alētheia's remarks about such processes as motion and coming-to-be, the goddess perhaps deters Parmenides from rival astronomical and embryological accounts, but she does not thereby inoculate him against astronomical and embryological accounts as such, nor, again, does she thereby display an entirely general critique of cosmology as such.

In a somewhat similar vein, some scholars have suggested that the motivation for Doxa can be explicated as the desire to produce a somehow 'useful' account of the heterogeneous surroundings in which our lives practically take place. Most recently, Cosgrove 2014 identifies a strictly practical impetus for Doxa, whose theories, he maintains, have no cosmological, scientific or philosophical status whatsoever. Rather, Parmenides' motivation for devising Doxa's theories is of the same sort as the motivation for designing a chariot axle that did not screech, or for growing superior olives. The pragmatic interpretation is, however, implausible on such a narrow construal of utility. Doxa is hardly limited to resolving or addressing everyday or concrete difficulties. Parmenides was evidently motivated to develop in Doxa numerous and various speculative theories, without feeling the need to specify the pragmatic value of those theories or to identify practical applications for them, even when it is far from clear that there could be any such practical applications or what they might be. (A couple of illustrative examples for this point can be found in the previous paragraph.) In Bio, moreover, the goddess herself presents Doxa's astronomy as—pace Cosgrove—the pursuit of a kind of knowledge (i.e. knowledge of...

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(adv Col. 1114B-C). For the ambitious and diverse range of Doxa's scientific theories, and for their meticulous and systematic nature, see further the recent survey in Kraus 2013, 489-96.

7 See e.g. Mourelatos 2011; Cerri 2011; Casertano 2011, 21-49; Kahn 2009, 209.

8 For the observation that Doxa's scale itself renders dialectical readings implausible, cf. Clark 1969, 24; Nehamas 2002, 57 n. 46.


10 Cosgrove 2014, 20-1; again: Doxa's theories are 'worth their pragmatic value or utility to mortals, but... that is all' (25-6).
celestial things and processes). On a broader understanding of utility, however, the pragmatic interpretation would be in itself insufficient and incomplete. If it is not just a matter of utility narrowly construed, then why are we not better off simply abandoning Doxa's speculative cosmological investigations of the heterogeneous surroundings in which our mortal lives take place, also after and in the light of Alêtheia?

An increasingly dominant scholarly position maintains that Doxa's theories represent Parmenides' own views of Doxastic things and are intended to describe such things correctly. I will follow and defend this position below. Crucially, however, it would be a mistake to assume that, once we take it that Parmenides allows that Doxa accounts for Doxastic things correctly, or once we respond to the ontological question with a particular model which explicates the precise status of Doxastic things and the precise manner in which they relate to what-is, the need to explain why Doxa is there vanishes. A resolution to the ontological question will not of itself constitute a resolution to the aetiological question. The reason for this is that Parmenides himself emphatically frames Doxa in a pejorative way. Even as the goddess decrees that Parmenides must also learn the beliefs of mortals (βροχών δόξας), she indicates that—in some sense—these beliefs lack real trust (πίστις αληθής, B1.30). In some sense, her account of Doxa is 'deceptive' (άπατηλόν, B8.52). Our text itself thus pointedly raises the aetiological question. To accentuate this point further, we may observe that Parmenides aligns what-is with άληθείη, understood as something like ultimate or fundamental reality. The goddess describes the subject-matter of the first part of the poem as άληθείης εύκυκλέος άτρεμές ἦτορ—'the unshaken heart of well-rounded άληθείη' (B1.29). This gloss both foreshadows the alignment of what-is with άληθείη and already indicates that Parmenides employs the latter term to refer to, not a logical property of thought or speech ('truth'), but rather a core, ultimate or fundamental reality: what-is is the unshaken heart of reality. In confirmation of both points, in

11 Contrast Cosgrove 2014, 20-1; again 24: Doxa is not a cognitive enterprise. I return to Bio below.
12 For an earlier expression of the pragmatic approach, see Minar 1949, 44, 49-50, 55; cf. similar suggestions in Inwood 2001, 25 n. 50; Hussey 1990, 30; Robbiano 2006, 210. Biographical explanations, such as Nietzsche's ascription of Alêtheia and Doxa to different stages in Parmenides' life (1974, 114-15), are inherently speculative and fail to explain the inclusion of both parts in the 'final edition' (Bi.28b-30); for a similar criticism, cf. Cosgrove 2014, 10-11.
13 See Palmer 2009, 162; Bredlow 2011, 221-2 (with n. 9 for further references; we may add e.g. Nehamas 2002, 56-60; Coxon 1986, 218; Cornford 1933, 97-8, 110-11). Nearly every contribution in Cordero 2011a adopts this position. See further Kraus 2013, 481-2 for a survey of the historical development of modern attitudes towards Doxa.
14 Palmer 2009, 378-80 convincingly defends the reading εύκυκλέος.
B8.50-1 the goddess uses ἀληθείη to refer to the subject-matter of her immediately preceding account and contemplation (πιστὸν λόγον ἡδὲ νόημα ἀμφὶς ἀληθείης), i.e. to what-is and the properties deduced for it in B8.15 Again, what-is, just like the heart of ἀληθείη (B1.29), is later also described as ‘unshaken’ (ἀτρέμές, B8.4). Doxa’s theories, as we shall see, are indeed taken to account correctly for their particular objects of inquiry, i.e. for the origins, natures and behaviours of Doxastic things and processes. And yet, in these programmatic remarks, Parmenides is at pains to emphasise the fundamental limitation of these theories. Doxa’s theories precisely do not and could not capture what-is: ‘the unshaken heart of reality’, the core, ultimate or fundamental nature of reality. In this respect, the investigations pursued in Doxa are emphatically relegated to a decidedly inferior status. Again, our text itself raises the aetiological question. If knowledge of the unshaken heart of reality is available to Parmenides, then why is it right for him and incumbent upon him (χρεώ δὲ σε, B1.28) to learn also these pejoratively-framed mortal beliefs (B1.29-30)? Even if Doxa is the best possible account of Doxastic things, why should Parmenides pursue all these systematic and painstaking investigations into the nature of Doxastic things—investigations which he himself so emphatically frames as inferior—after attaining the knowledge of the heart of reality in Alētheia? As Sedley writes, ‘why join in the game?’

Thus, the terminology of ἀληθείη is not used here to qualify the account and contemplation themselves as ‘true’. Note further B1.30, B8.28 (πιστὸς ἀληθῆς: ‘true conviction’, i.e. real or genuine conviction), and again, B8.17-18 (‘for it is not a real [ἀληθῆς] path’). In my remarks here on the semantics of ἀληθείη and ἀληθῆς in Parmenides, I follow Palmer 2009, 89-93; Coxon 1986, 168; and Cole 1983, 25-6. We need not exclude, as secondary connotations of this terminology, ‘truth’ and ‘what is true’ insofar as these typify true accounts of the true nature of ultimate reality.

Sedley 1999a, 123. (Even if, then, we read ὡς at B8.61 as final rather than causal, this will hardly resolve the aetiological question, since we would still ask ourselves why Parmenides should wish to join this mortal race in the first place.) We could only explain away the aetiological question by denying somehow that the goddess’s pejorative comments in fact refer to Parmenides’ cosmology. The (different) attempts to do so in Thanassas 2006, 2011, 300-1, and Cordero 2011 are impossible to accept. Thanassas isolates an erroneous (and pejoratively-framed) Doxa, identified with ‘mortal beliefs’ and founded on separating Light and Night (B8.51-9), from an appropriate Doxa, founded on mixing Light and Night (B8.60-B19). To put it mildly, Thanassas reads against the text and the flow of the exposition. B8.50-2 indicates that the account about ἀληθείη is now complete and that ‘from this point’ or ‘henceforth’ (ἀπό τοῦδε) the subject-matter will be ‘mortal beliefs’ (cf. B1.28b-30). There follows an introduction of the two opposite elements Light and Night (B8.53-9) and then a cosmology based on the same two opposite elements (B9-B19 and the relevant testimonia). B8.60 (τὸν . . . φάτιζω) is not a sudden and bizarrely compressed introduction of a new and competing cosmological system. Rather,
I pursue below a different approach with a different focus, exploring the aetiological and epistemological questions in relation to one another. In Section 2, I argue that Parmenides advances a physiological theory of specifically human cognition (B16). According to this theory, all humans, qua humans, passively and ineluctably experience, recognise and form beliefs about heterogeneous and changeable things and processes. They do so, moreover, in terms of the same *krisis* or ‘contrast’ (‘Light’ / ‘Night’, or ‘Hot’ / ‘Cold’, etc.) which constitutes also the essence and conceptual basis of Doxa’s cosmology. I will not claim that B16 is programmatic. B16 does not aim to explain why Doxa is there. I will argue, however, that B16 articulates a theory which, along with certain further considerations, best grounds an explanation of why Parmenides pursues and presents cosmological inquiries into heterogeneous and changeable things (Doxa) which, even as they correctly account for those things, could not capture the homogeneous and unchanging nature of what-is (Alētheia). But if we first asked ‘Why did Parmenides write Doxa?’ we will now ask ‘How could Parmenides have written Alētheia?’ If Parmenides, as a mortal, must think in the categories of Doxa, through the *krisis* Light / Night, how could he have also sustained reflection in the qualitatively different and competing categories of Alētheia, through the *krisis* is / is not? In Section 3, I argue that Parmenides construes the mortal agent as a complex which comprises not only a human but also a divine part—the mortal’s (hot, aethereal) soul. The journey towards grasping Alētheia’s *krisis*, mastering its argumentation and ascertaining the nature of what-is involves, for Parmenides, a divinisation of the knower, who comes to think with—or as—his divine soul, momentarily transcending the uncontrollable, Doxastic deliverances of specifically human cognition. There is *prima facie*, then, a discrepancy between the epistemology of mortal cognition adumbrated in Doxa (B16) and the mortal’s ability to cognise what-is

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it announces the beginning of the same cosmological account whose central principles have just now been introduced. ἀπὸ τοῦδε (B8.51) does not merely look forward to the next eight lines! Cordero suggests that Parmenides’ own cosmological tenets (B8.11, 13-18) do not fall under what the poem labels and denigrates as ‘mortal beliefs’. He places these fragments in Alētheia and limits the pejoratively-framed *Doxa* to a short postscript (B9, 12, 19). In B1.28b-30, however, *Doxa* (βροτῶν δόξας) is presented as one of the two parts of the *kouroi*’s programme of study. Furthermore, while the mortals are criticised for admitting e.g. locomotion (τόπον ἄλλασσει) to their understanding of ultimate reality (B8.39-41), Cordero himself includes doctrines involving coming-to-be, locomotion etc. within Alētheia (cf. e.g. B8.21, 26-31; for a similar criticism, see Cosgrove 2014, 6-7). Later commentators clearly indicate that Parmenides located all his physical accounts (of coming-to-be etc.) in what he labelled Doxai (Theophrastus ap. Alexander, *in Metaph.* 31.7-14 Hayduck = A7; Simplicius, *in De Cael.* 556.12-14 Heiberg = Coxon 1986, Testim. 203; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* 984b2-4).
implied in *Alētheia*. By addressing and resolving this discrepancy in the way sketched above we will, I suggest, deepen our understanding of the relation between mortal and divine in Parmenides’ poem and of the relation between the two parts of the poem.

In what follows, then, we will investigate the aetiological and epistemological questions as interrelated and mutually illuminating matters. Our concern here, therefore, is to pursue a complementary but different—and, I think, profitable—perspective on the problem of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides’ poem. So it will not be an ambition of this paper to advance a particular response to the ontological question. I will not attempt here to develop a particular view concerning the precise status of Doxastic things or the precise manner in which they relate to what-is (nor will the arguments below rely on a particular elaboration of these matters). But I am of course by no means suggesting that we could pursue either the epistemological or the aetiological questions without any consideration of *Alētheia* and its account of what-is. In the course of the following arguments concerning the aetiological and epistemological questions, we will establish certain limited but important points, which any adequate response to the ontological question—any elaboration of the precise manner in which what-is and Doxastic things relate to one another—will, I believe, have to take into account. Most importantly, we will (as already indicated above) see that mortals are manifestly there to be spoken to and about and to err and to know, and that Doxastic objects and processes can be known, and expounded correctly or incorrectly.

2  Why did Parmenides write *Doxa*?


17 Preserved by Theophrastus and the two oldest mss. of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*. *ἐκάστω* (A\(^b\)) and *ἐκάστος* (E\(^2\)) cannot be conclusively excluded although, as Coxon 1986, 248 argues, the former seems a corruption of *ἐκάστος* and the latter a later correction. Cf. Heitsch 1974, 191; Verdenius 1964, 6; Tarán 1965, 169.

18 Retaining the manuscripts’ *χρᾶσι* and postulating some implicit subject (e.g. *νόος* or *τις*) would yield the same overall sense (as Heitsch 1974, 191 observes) but involve an unusual use of *ἐχει* (Mourelatos 2008, 253; cf. Fränkel 1975, 16; Verdenius 1964, 14).

19 Over Aristotle’s all-but-unparalleled and awkward *πολυκάμπτων*, following Mansfeld 1996, 162-3 n. 17; Coxon 1986, 248; Verdenius 1964, 7-8; Tarán 1965, 170.

έστιν δπερ φρονέει μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν καὶ πάσιν καὶ παντὶ· τό γαρ πλέον ἐστὶ νόημα.

For as on each occasion is the mixture of much-wandering limbs, so is mind present to humans; for, in all humans and in each, that which cognises is the same thing, namely the nature of the frame; for the full is thought.

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21 Construing δπερ as subject of ἐστίν and φρονέει, μελέων φύσις as in apposition with it, cf. e.g. Dk ad loc.; KRS 1983, 261. Alternatively, we may render Bi6.2b-4a as: 'for, in all humans and in each, the nature of the frame is the same as that which it cognises,' construing μελέων φύσις as the subject of both ἐστίν and φρονέει, with αὐτό as its predicate and δπερ as accusative. Cf. e.g. Fränkel 1975, 42 n. 53; Vlastos 1946, 66; Kahn 1969, 722; Laks 1990, 7. The marked syntactic ambiguity of Bi6.2b-4c could be deliberate (cf. Hussey 2006, 29 for this suggestion), and both of these senses could be at play. Indeed, both statements will be true on the account of Bi6 advanced below. The rendering 'in all humans and in each, it is the same thing which the nature of the frame cognises' (e.g. Tarán 1965, 256) is inconsistent with the basic view that different mixtures produce different cognitions (Bi6.1-2a, with Theophrastus, de sens. 3.3-4: διὰ τὴν διάνοιαν; cf. Bredlow 2011, 244). It is much more plausible to take καὶ πάσιν καὶ παντὶ, as a universalising intensifier (cf. ἐκάστοτ'), with the immediately preceding and emphatic dative plural ἄνθρωποισιν (which repeats ἄνθρωποι at Bi6.2a) than, tortuously, with αὐτό back in Bi6.2b, as Bredlow 2011, 243-5 proposes: 'what the nature of the limbs thinks in men is the same as each and every thing' (i.e. Light and Night). My overall argument about Bi6 below, though, could work with Bredlow's grammatical construal.

22 Cf. B9.3-4: the totality of things is full (πλέον) of the two Doxastic elements (cf. also B8.24). Against 'more', Tarán 1965, 256-7 compellingly argues that, by identifying thought with whichever element exceeds, Parmenides would be denying the lesser element any influence whatsoever on any mortal thought, even when the two elements are almost evenly mixed in the frame. In Bi6.1-2a it is particular mixtures of both elements which determine the nature of our mind; see further Mansfeld 1964, 191-2; Laks 1990, 7-8; Kraus 2013, 494-5. Bredlow 2011, 241-2 objects to 'full' that, to make sense of this rendering, we would have to ascribe to Parmenides a fully worked-out, Empedoclean theory of cognition-through-pores. But the statement that our thought is 'the full' need not involve more than the obscure and embryonic idea that our thought is the sum of Light and Night in our frame, perhaps particularly as it encounters, receives and so cognises Light and Night from without. Empedocles can plausibly be seen to develop and elaborate Parmenides' murky notion of 'the full'; cf. Laks 1990, 16-18.

23 Both Theophrastus' commentary (note esp. δυοΐν δντοιν στοιχείοιν, de sens. 3.2, and his presently addressed discussion of corpses), and the references to mixture and the human body in Bi6 itself, secure its Doxastic provenance. For a detailed refutation of the attempt in Hershbell 1983 to locate Bi6 in Alētheia, see Andriopoulos 1975, esp. 556-7; cf. Laks 1990, 3 n. 9.
Although various details about B16 and its doxographic context are uncertain, we can extricate what we require here from the fragment in a relatively circumscribed and secure way. B16.1-2 expresses a physiological theory of human cognition. Different mixtures in our frame determine in each instance the nature of our mind (ὡς...τῶς νόος ἀνθρώποισι). μελέων, especially since Parmenides speaks of the μελέων φύσις ἀνθρώποισιν in B16.3b, most probably refers to the human frame as a whole, rather than directly to the two cosmic elements. Nonetheless, Theophrastus’ remarks leave it beyond doubt that the mixture in question is of the two elements: ‘there are two elements (δύο δντοιν στοιχείοιν) and our knowledge depends on that which exceeds. Thought varies according to whether the hot or the cold predominates’ (de sensibus 3.2-3). The ‘mixture of our frame’ (or ‘limbs’), then, still signifies the particular compound of Hot and Cold of which our frame consists at any given moment. Crucially, Theophrastus’ paraphrase of a lost passage confirms his assertions both that Parmenides adopted the principle that like perceives like and that Parmenides regarded the cosmological elements as that by which we cognise (de sens. 4.3-6):27

But it is clear that he attributes perception also to the opposite [sc. element] by itself from that passage in which he says (έν οΐς φησι) that a corpse, because of the departure of fire, does not perceive light, heat and sound, but does perceive cold and silence and the opposites.

Theophrastus appears to work from a first-hand acquaintance with the original passage (έν οΐς φησι) and, whatever general view we hold of his credentials as a doxographer, could not possibly have fabricated the very specific view that Cold corpses perceive Cold, but not Hot. The systoichia of light, heat and sound as contrasted with cold, silence ‘and the opposites’ betrays the misleadingly oversimplified nature of Theophrastus’ terminology of Hot and Cold (retained below for convenience), familiar from the Peripatetic doxography of Parmenides elsewhere. Parmenides, it seems, employs different adjectives and

I comment below on the relation between the cognitive and perceptual language in B16 and de sens. 3-4. For now, I will use both sorts of terms interchangeably.

Or, if we read ἐκάστης or ἐκαστος (cf. n. 17 above), for each one.

24 Fränkel 1975, 16; Tarân 1965, 170.

25 For μέλεα or γύια signifying the living mortal’s frame as a whole, see e.g. Iliad 17.211; Odyssey 6.140; cf. Fränkel 1975, 15; Tarân 1965, 170.

26 Bredlow 2011, 235-6 indirectly supports the historical plausibility of Theophrastus’ ascription of a like-by-like position to Parmenides by noting various earlier and near-contemporary parallels (e.g. Empedocles 31 Bio9 DK).

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labels to bring out different perceptual aspects of the opposition between the two Doxastic elements (Light / Night, light / heavy, rare / dense etc.; see B8.56-9). The catalogue of what the Cold corpse can and cannot perceive indicates that, for Parmenides, through each Doxastic element we perceive other instantiations of that element in all its perceptual aspects (Light: bright / light / hot / rare etc.; Night: dark / heavy / cold / dense etc.). The corpse passage also shows—although this is less crucial for our purposes—that a mixture of both elements is not necessary for perception to occur. Indeed, Theophrastus expressly recounts the passage to make precisely this point. The Cold corpse perceives only Cold. The καί in καί τῷ ἐναντίῳ καθ' αὐτό underscores that Hot too is, of course, likewise perceived through Hot by itself. Nonetheless, while mixtures of both elements are not essential for cognition as such, they do characterise the cognition of living humans. While by the Hot in us we independently perceive Hot and by the Cold we independently perceive Cold, different mixtures of both elements in the human agent produce different compound cognitive acts, which involve both the perception of Hot (through Hot) and the perception of Cold (through Cold).29

28 This is very strong evidence for the view that, when Theophrastus writes 'a thought through the Hot (τήν διὰ τὸ θερμόν) is better and purer; yet even this thought requires a certain symmetria (τινός συμμετρίας)' (de sens. 3.4-5), he is not stating (inconsistently with his remarks about the corpse passage) that, for any cognition to occur, there must be some proportion of both Hot and Cold in the cognising subject. Rather, he is stating that even the superior thought of Hot through Hot is not independent of the basic like-by-like requirement for some sort of correspondence, similarity or fit between subject and objects of perception. That is, perception through Hot is similarly limited in its objects only to what matches and is like the Hot; i.e. Hot. συμμετρία is a recurrent terminus technicus in de sensibus and invariably signifies, not a proportion between the constitutive elements of a mixture, but that an organ of perception is somehow commensurable with its object and so adequately receptive of it (12.4; 12.7; 13.3; 14.5; 15.5; 8; 32.6; 35.8; 46.3). See further Fränkel 1975, 17; Laks 1990, 14-16; Stratton 1917, 157-8 n. 5. We may add that it is difficult to see how 'a thought through the Hot (διὰ τὸ θερμόν)' could conceivably describe a thought in which Hot predominates over Cold but in which both are involved. Conversely, it naturally signifies the thought of Hot through Hot.

29 Following Laks 1990, 7. This sufficiently explains the motivation for Theophrastus’ remark that ‘there are two elements and our knowledge depends on that which exceeds’ (de sens. 3.2-3). This will be true of the cognitive life of living humans, who comprise both elements. A preponderance of Hot leads to better memory and, in general, mental acuity (βελτίω δὲ καί καθαρωτέραν, de sens. 3.4; διό καί... κράσεως, de sens. 4.1-2; also A46a-b) whereas a preponderance of Cold has the opposite effects. Given the interpretation of συμμετρία defended in the previous note, κατά τὸ ὑπερβάλλον (de sens. 3.2-3) is not a gloss...
Let us underscore the key aspects of the theory. By Hot and Cold we cognise Hot and Cold respectively. Our cognition is determined at each moment by the combinations of Hot and Cold of which our mortal bodies consist. What the mortal body cognises at any moment are its own or other instances of these elements (its cognitive engagement with which is described as a state of fullness).

Three points bear emphasising further. First, B16 pointedly describes the cognition of humans (ἀνθρώποισι... ἀνθρώποισιν, B16.2-3). As Reinhardt remarks: ‘[c]oming from the goddess’s lips, how studied is the emphasis on human knowledge.’ Secondly, B16 is a universalising account of human cognition (ν έκάστοι... καὶ πᾶσι καὶ παντὶ). It nowhere indicates any room for exceptions. It describes all, not some, acts of human cognition. Thirdly, and relatedly, human cognition of Hot and Cold is, on this theory, passively determined by the deliverances of physiological mechanisms. As on each occasion is the mixture of their limbs, so is mind simply present to humans (ώς... τῶς νόσος ἀνθρώποισι παρέστηκεν). The poetic models which B16 famously echoes similarly underscore the passive determination of, again, specifically human thought: ‘for such is the mind (νόσος) of humans (ἀνθρώπων) upon the earth as the day which the father of gods and humans brings upon them’ (Odyssey 18.136-7); ‘such... becomes the mind for mortal humans (τοῖος ἄνθρωποις θυμός... γίνεται θνητοῖς), as the day which Zeus brings upon them’ (Archilochus fr. 131 West). According to B16, for the human mind, cognition of Hot and Cold, and by Hot and Cold, is something that just happens.

Parmenides’ own cognitive vocabulary (νόος, φρονέει, νόημα) indicates that B16 expounds the physiological mechanisms which determine the kinds of thing of which we are aware, as well as our thoughts and judgements with regards to such things. Importantly, νοείν and its cognates signify, not merely ‘thought’ without involving what we would call a belief component, but rather the apprehension of a situation, object or person in a way that implies the formation of a judgement or judgements with regards to them. To give two of countless possible illustrations: Helen recognises that the neck of the disguised Aphrodite is that of a deity (ένόησε θεάς... δειρήν, Iliad 3.396 ff.), while

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of B16.4 implying that Theophrastus read πλέον as ‘more’ (following Laks 1990, 6; contra e.g. Coxon 1986, 250; Kraus 2013, 494).

21 Pace Bredlow 2011, 244, then, καὶ πᾶσι καὶ παντὶ is not redundant when taken with ἀνθρώποισιν (see n. 21 above): it serves to underscore this universalising force of B16.
22 On these echoes, see Fränkel 1975, 15; cf. e.g. Heitsch 1974, 194-5; Coxon 1986, 91, 248-9; Kraus 2013, 494.
Talthybius recognises that the man before him is Machaon (τὸν δὲ νόησεν κ.τ.λ., Iliad 4.200). By Parmenides' time, an erring νόος was not an incoherent notion. Aristotle's offhand attribution to Parmenides (among various others) of the view that all our impressions must be true (Metaph. 1009b13-15) is thus quite unnecessary. The important point for us, however, is that νόος is always a faculty which, whether successfully or not, attempts to grasp correctly a given object or state of affairs (rather than merely 'think' or 'perceive'). To put the point more generally, B16 offers a theory, not merely of sensory perceptions that involve no belief component, but, again, of the factors which determine the kinds of thing of which mortals are aware, as well as their thoughts and judgements with regards to them.

Parmenides' pivotal and calculated use of the vocabulary of krisis, a term which encompasses both dichotomies and judgements made on their basis, and especially his contrast between the krisis of Alētheia and the krisis of Doxa, are important for our purposes. By analysing the nature of the Doxastic krisis, and how it relates to Alētheia's krisis, we may sharpen our account of the kind of cognition ascribed to the mortal mind in B16 and clarify the fragment's import for the epistemological question. The goddess exhorts the kouros: 'judge by reasoning (κρίναι δέ λόγῳ) the much-contested examination spoken by me' (B7.5). The discrimination—κρίναι—which the goddess prescribes here can only align with the contrast, or krisis, between 'is' and 'is not' which structures the

33 For νοείν as signifying the cognition of a situation, analogous in its non-inferential operation to sense-perception, see also e.g. Odyssey 16.160; Xenophanes 21 B24 δὲ (δρα...νοη...δεκαοι). On νόος and νοείν, see further Tor 2013, 288 with nn. 68-71; von Fritz 1974, esp. 23-4; 33; Warden 1971, esp. 3-4; Darcus- Sullivan 1994, esp. 108. As Verdenius 1964, 16 points out, φρονέει at B16.3 must signify the function of the νόος and is here, as often, almost synonymous with γιγνώσκειν (cognise, recognise; cf. ἡ γιγνώσις, de sens. 3.3; τινά γιγνώσιν, de sens. 4.7), as in the Homeric formula γινώσκω, φρονέω· τά γε 8ή νοέοντι κελεύει (Odyssey 16.136), where the three verbs are hardly differentiated.

34 Hesiod, Od 323, 373, 685; Th. 537, with von Fritz 1974, 29; cf. Mourelatos 2008, 175-6. A number of notoriously difficult verses in Alētheia (B3; B6.1-2®; B8.34-6®; cf. B8.7-9), any syntactic construal of which could only ever be very tentative, express some sort of close connection between what-is and understanding (νοείν). But however we read these verses Parmenides does not invariably understand by νόος the successful cognition of what-is (πλαγκτόν νόον, B6.5-6; νόος... νόημα, Β6). Mourelatos most helpfully describes the affinity between what-is and understanding in these obscure verses as an ideal rather than a fact, styling it a 'normative necessity' (loc. cit.; cf. Curd 1998, 49).

35 Parmenides' use of this cognitive language thus invalidates Vlastos' claim that B16 expresses a theory strictly of non-cognitive sense-perception, 1946, 67. I return below to the issue of sense-perception.

36 For separation and selection, see e.g. Iliad 2.362, 5.501, 6.188, 9.521, 11.697; for judgements, e.g. Iliad 16.387; cf. Kahn 1973, 382.
entire argumentation in Alêtheia: 'but the discrimination (χρίσις) concerning these matters lies in this: (it) is or (it) is not (έστιν ή ούκ έστιν') (Β8.15-16). The reasoning (λόγψ) she prescribes presumably looks forward to the deductions argued for on the basis of this krisis in B8. The goddess traces mortal beliefs to a pointedly different krisis, one between two elemental opposites with respect to their perceptual form: δόξα... βροτεΐα... τάντία δ' ἐκρίναντο δέμας (Β8.51, 55).37 Aristotle aligns (τάττει, Metaph. 986b35-6) and even identifies (gc 1.3, 318b7-8) Light with what-is and Night with what-is-not. Identifying either element with what-is is untenable because both possess properties which are incompatible with the properties of what-is.38 Light, for example, is mobile (B12.2) while what-is is immobile (B8.26; cf. B8.41). Nor can we align either Doxastic element with what-is or what-is-not. Parmenides emphatically highlights their equality (iσων ἀμφότερων, B9.4).39 There is nothing negative or privative about Night as contrasted with Light (or vice versa). Night, for example, is heavier and denser than Light, which is also, for its part, characterised by some measure of weight and density (B8.57-9). Both elements, therefore, constitute equally positive things, and neither can be asymmetrically aligned with what-is-not.40 Most importantly, all such alignments obscure the qualitative difference between the distinction expressed by Alêtheia's krisis (is / is not, what-is / what-is-not) and by Doxa's krisis (Light / Night, or Hot / Cold etc.).41 On any reading, Alêtheia does not establish what-is-not as an equally positive counterpart to what-is. Parmenides stresses the equality of what-is with itself and the stable self-sufficiency of its identity (ο! γαρ πάντοθεν ίσον, B8.49; ταύτων τ' ἐν ταύτω τε μένον καθ' έαυτό τε κείται, Β8.29). By contrast, the two Doxastic elements are precisely equal with each other and the identity of each with itself is pointedly qualified by its demarcation from its counterpart: έωυτω πάντοσε τωύτόν, τῷ δ' έτέρῳ μὴ τωύτόν (Β8.57-8).42 Parmenides' juxtapositions of contrary attributes (Light / Night, light / heavy, rare / dense etc., B8.56-9) characterise the elements

37 δέμας is used of living bodies or bodies regarded as alive (Coxon 1986, 221); it indicates a thing's concrete, perceptual aspects: the daughter of Chryses is not inferior to Clytaemnestra ού δέμας ούδε φυήν (Iliad 1.115).
39 See similarly e.g. Long 1975, 90; Verdenius 1964, 62; Kraus 2013, 487-8.
40 The superior mental vitality of Hot and, in general, the axiological nature of the contrast between the two elements (cf. n. 29 above, n. 88 below; also B8.59) does not support Aristotle's mistaken alignment, but it may explain it.
41 In highlighting the qualitative difference between the two krisis, I follow and develop Mansfeld 1964, 86-91, 133; cf. also Kraus 2013, 489.
42 This phrase clearly applies symmetrically to both Doxastic elements (νβ άτάρ κάκεΐνο κ.τ.λ., B8.58-9), and cannot be seen as attributing specifically to Light one of the properties of what-is, pace Kahn 2009, 216; Curd 1998, 106.
of Doxa as enantiomorphic opposites, each one being what the other is not.\(^{43}\)

Light, then, is hot, light, rarefied etc. and is not cold, dark, heavy, dense etc. The opposite is the case for Night. The krisis of Alētheia, therefore, maintains a distinction between ‘is’ and ‘is not’, and aligns the homogeneous what-is entirely with ‘is’ and in no way with ‘is not’. Conversely, the Doxastic krisis transgresses the distinction between ‘is’ and ‘is not’ by positing two elements each of which simultaneously is (itself) and is not (the other): ‘being and not-being’ (εἰναι τε καὶ οὐχί, B8.40; and again: ἐωυτῷ πάντοτε τωύτων, τῷ δ’ ἐτέρῳ μὴ τωύτον, B8.57-8). Doxa’s krisis articulates two equal, elemental opposites. It precisely fails to retain the separation between ‘is’ and ‘is not’. We see here, importantly, that Alētheia’s krisis and Doxa’s krisis are competing in the sense that we could not maintain, and think in terms of, both sorts of demarcation at the same time. The Doxastic contrast between Light and Night—both of which are retained in the cosmology and each of which is itself and is not the other—transgresses Alētheia’s krisis, which separates ‘is’ from ‘is not’, only one of which is retained (‘is’) and characterises what-is. When we think in terms of Doxa’s krisis, we cannot at the same time think in terms of Alētheia’s krisis.

Following on (and in further support of) this discussion of Doxa’s krisis, I suggest a (to my knowledge) new way of understanding the controversial B8.54 (here with the preceding and following line):

> ‘For they resolved\(^{44}\) to name two forms, of which just one may not be named (τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἔστιν)—this is where they have gone astray (ἐν ω πεπλανημένοι εἰσίν)—and they distinguished opposites by their appearance (τάντία δ’ ἐκρίναντο δέμας,).

The construal ‘one of which must not be named (sc. while it is right to name the other)’ draws on Aristotle’s alignment of one element with what-is and the other with what-is-not, which I rejected above.\(^{45}\) Schofield observes that the alternative rendering, ‘of which just one may not be named (sc. without the other)’, is incoherent as a criticism of the mortals, who name both.\(^{46}\) I would retain this construal but interpret the phrase, not as itself criticising the

\(^{43}\) Cf. e.g. Curd 1998, 107-8; Nehamas 2002, 55 n. 43.

\(^{44}\) I remark further below in this section on the voluntariness associated with mortal ‘naming’.

\(^{45}\) E.g. Vlastos 1946, 74; Kahn 2009, 216-17; favouring Night: Popper 1992, 12-16; Sedley 1999a, 124.

\(^{46}\) KRS 256 n. 1, contrast KR; for the construal see e.g. Verdenius 1964, 62; Clark 1969, 26.
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mortals, but as an analysis of what I argued above is the essential relation between the two enantiomorphic opposites of Doxa's krisis (each of which essentially both is itself and is not the other), as contrasted with Alêtheia's krisis. By contrast with the krisis between 'is' and 'is not', in which one element is retained ('is') and the other rejected ('is not'), one cannot postulate one Doxastic element but deny its counterpart. If there is Light, there must also be Night. 'Doxastic monism' is a contradiction in terms. τῶν μίαν οὐ χρεών ἔστιν is the goddess's analysis of the nature of the Doxastic krisis, while ἐν ὧν πεπλανημένοι εἰσὶν is her parenthetical denunciation of the mortals, which is evoked by that analysis but pertains to μορφὰς... ἔστιν as a whole:

'they resolved to name two forms, of which just one [sc. without the other] may not be named [i.e. unlike 'is' and 'is not', one of which must be retained ('is') and the other discarded ('is not'): naming opposites in accordance with this other kind of krisis is where they went wrong] and they distinguished opposites in accordance with their perceptual aspects (ἐκρίναντο δέμας)."47

What of the relation between the Doxastic krisis and sense-perception? We saw that Parmenides uses in B16 cognitive rather than perceptual language (νόος, φρονέει, νόημα). Was Theophrastus, then, categorically wrong to discuss B16 in his de sensibus, let alone to write that Parmenides 'speaks of perceiving (αἴσθάνεσθαι) and cognising (φρονείν) as one and the same' (de sens. 4.1)? First, the lost passage which dealt with the ability of corpses to experience cold and silence, and their inability to experience sound, heat and warmth, indicates that the theory covers also what falls under 'sense-perception'. Secondly, the two sensible elements of Doxa (Light / Night, Hot / Cold, etc.)—discriminated in accordance with their sensible aspects (ἐκρίναντο δέμας, B8.55)—are both that by which we cognise and what we cognise. The things by which and of which humans qua humans are fundamentally aware are therefore, in a way, perceptual. Finally, the goddess associates sensory experiences with the mental habits of the mortals criticised in Alêtheia. She warns Parmenides not to be bullied by habit born of long experience (ἔθος πολύπειρον) nor 'to ply an aimless

47 On this reading, then, τῶν... εἰσὶν smoothly links μορφὰς... ἀνομάζειν with τάντα... δέμας as a coherent progression. This, coupled with its suitability as an analysis of the Doxastic krisis, justifies its adoption over Cornford's 'not so much as one of which should be named' (1933, 109) which, as Clark 1969, 26 observes, renders the remark ἐν ὧν πεπλανημένοι εἰσὶν awkwardly redundant.
eye and echoing ear and tongue' (B7.3-5). It is impossible to accept Mansfeld's contention that, when referring here to 'eye', 'ear' and 'tongue', Parmenides does not connote sensory experiences.\textsuperscript{48} This does not mean that Parmenides categorically denigrates sensory experiences. Perceptual observations permeate Doxa's accounts of Doxastic things. But perceptual observations are not the means by which one arrives at knowledge of what-is.\textsuperscript{49} If acquiesced in uncritically and unreflectively, sensory experiences will lead one away from such knowledge. None of these points imply that Parmenides elaborated a theory, or even clearly isolated the category, of 'sense-perception' as such.\textsuperscript{50}

Theophrastus for his part, in saying that Parmenides speaks of perceiving and cognising as the same, probably gets at the point that in B16 Parmenides simply fails to distinguish what the Peripatetics would isolate as (i) the perceptual activities of the soul and (ii) the mind's activity (τὰ νοεῖν), in which there is 'correctly' and 'incorrectly' (τὰ ἀρorrectάκατα και τὰ μὴ ἀρorrectάκατα) with the former including φρόνησις (see esp. Aristotle, \textit{DA} \textit{427b}6-11; cf. \textit{427a}21-8).\textsuperscript{51}

It is time to bring our discussion of the epistemological question (to this point) to bear on the aetiological question. Parmenides identifies as the essence and conceptual basis of Doxa's cosmology a \textit{krisis} between two enantimorphic elements with respect to their sensible aspects (δέμας). By a brute, physiological necessity, human cognition functions in accordance with this very same \textit{krisis}. Conversely, \textit{Alētheia}'s argumentation and its concept of the homogeneous what-is is framed by the qualitatively different \textit{krisis} between 'is' and 'is not'. We could not maintain and think in terms of both sorts of demarcations (\textit{kriseis}) at one and the same time.

The human mind is analysed in terms of mixtures between Hot and Cold and in accordance with the principle of like-by-like. Cognition of, and in terms of, the two enantimorphic elements occurs in the human mind passively and ineluctably. The tendency of mortals to think in accordance with the Doxastic \textit{krisis}, to recognise Doxastic things and to form judgements (e.g. 'this man moves,' 'this corpse is cold') with respect to them, is a function of the very

\textsuperscript{48} Mansfeld 1999, 331-3; followed by Robbiano 2006, 97-8; Bredlow 2011, 232-3. Mansfeld's positive contention, that Parmenides (I would say, \textit{also}) refers more broadly to the assumptions and categories which structure the mortal world-view and language (γλώσσαν), is persuasive.

\textsuperscript{49} Cf. similarly Frère 2011, 140 and 144-5.

\textsuperscript{50} Something Mansfeld 1999, 342-4 rightly questions.

\textsuperscript{51} It seems to be for precisely the same reason and on the same grounds that Parmenides (Theophrastus \textit{ap. DL} 9.22 = \textit{A1.11-12}) and Democritus (Aristotle, \textit{DA} 404a27-31) are said to be 'identifying' ψυχή and νοος. See further Verdenius 1964, 16; Mansfeld 1964, 172.
constitution of their cognitive apparatus. Consisting of Hot and Cold, we think Hot and Cold and in terms of Hot and Cold (Light and Night, Rare and Dense, etc.). ‘Perception’ in Doxa is thus not merely of sensible qualities narrowly construed, but of cosmic categories and elements. In perceiving trees and humans, what we perceive are the elements of which they consist; one does not simply feel warm, one perceives mixtures of Hot and Cold.52

In B16, Parmenides recognises, and couches in a cognitive theory, a rather plausible insight: the human mind cannot avoid experiencing, recognising and generating judgements with regards to a multiplicity of heterogeneous things which display such perceptual processes as generation and locomotion. Parmenides could no more simply discard such first-order judgements than he could switch off such experiences and such recognition. Parmenides, I suggest, pursued and included Doxa’s cosmology because he held (i) that thinking in accordance with contrasts between the two sensible opposites, and experiencing, recognising and forming first-order judgements with regards to a multiplicity of heterogeneous things such as we encounter in our sensory experiences, is an inescapable and even appropriate aspect of what it is to think and live as a mortal,53 and (ii) that the theories advanced in Doxa—even as they fail to capture the homogeneous and unchanging nature of ‘the unshaken heart’ of reality—account for such heterogeneous and multiple things correctly.

Point (ii) needs to be insisted upon. It might be objected that, since B16’s theory of human cognition comes from Doxa, it is deceptive and therefore should not worry us in the first place regarding what it does or does not imply concerning mortal cognitive agents. First, the deceptiveness of the goddess’s cosmological account (άπατηλόν) is contrasted, not with alternative accounts of the same things (mortals, stars etc.), but with Alētheia’s account of what-is (B8.50-2). The goddess implies through this contrast that the kouros is now, having heard Alētheia, in a position to recognise the ensuing deceptiveness. This again indicates that Doxa’s theories are deceptive, not in their internal details (e.g. in how its embryology describes embryos), but rather in their potential to mislead wayward mortals into mistaking them for accounts which get at and disclose the nature of the ultimate reality.54 Mortals are misled in just this way when they think that categories like becoming, perishing and

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52 For this last point, cf. von Fritz 1974, 50-1.
53 χρεώ δέ σε (B1.28b) highlights that it is appropriate for Parmenides to learn also Doxa. See Mourelatos 2008, 277-8 (and cf. p. xxxi), for the point that χρεών and its cognates signify a normative, ‘right, due or proper necessity’.
54 See similarly Nehamas 2002, 59 (see also 58 n. 49 on B1.31-2).
locomotion capture reality (πεποιθότες εἶναι ἀληθῆ, B8.39). In another important programmatic statement, the goddess promises Parmenides, thrice within five lines, knowledge of various celestial Doxastic things and processes (εἶση... πεύση... εἰδήσεις, Bio). This programmatic use of epistemic vocabulary with respect to Doxastic things indicates that theories pertaining to such things can describe them correctly or incorrectly and that Doxa’s theories do so correctly. The proposition that the moon’s light is a reflection of the sun’s (B14-15) accounts for the moon and its source of light correctly, in a way that competing accounts (e.g. Anaximander 12 A1.5 DK; Anaximenes 13 A7.4 DK) do not. Bio thus corroborates the foregoing interpretation of the deceptiveness of Doxa and confirms what is already suggested independently by the comprehensive scope, systematic nature and meticulous detail of Parmenides’ scientific inquiries: Doxa expresses Parmenides’ own views of Doxastic things. Adopting

55 Again, it is because Doxa’s theories are essentially incapable of disclosing the unshaken heart of ἀληθή (B1.29)—i.e. what-is and its properties—that they can be said to lack true or real (ἀληθής) trust (Bi.3ob). On Parmenides’ use of the terminology of ἀληθή— and his alignment of ἀληθή with what-is—see Section 1 above. Bi.3ob could perhaps also suggest that the changeable and heterogeneous things (like stars and mortals) which are the objects of the cosmological inquiries pursued in the second part of the poem simply do not lend themselves to the same sort of sheer, pure steadfastness and reliability of apprehension to which the deductive study of the nature and properties of the unshaken heart of reality does lend itself; for this line of interpretation, see Palmer 2009, e.g. 92, 167-75. Of course, the insight that this distinct kind of steadfastness and reliability of apprehension is possible in the deductive study of what-is but not in the case of inquiries into the natures and behaviours of Doxastic things would not imply that the latter cannot be understood or correctly accounted for (nor does Palmer suggest otherwise). See similarly Vlastos 2008, 376-8.

56 As is generally assumed in the ancient doxography, e.g. Aristotle, Metaph. 984b2-4; Theophrastus ap. Alexander, in Metaph. 31.7-14 Hayduck = A7; Coxon 1986, Testim. 193 (from Philoponus) and 203 (Simplicius); Plutarch (as cited in n. 6 above). See above Section 1 with n. 13 for the increasing popularity of this view in recent scholarship. Pace Cosgrove, therefore, Doxa’s accounts are not, qua theories, ‘no better than nonsense’ (2014, 9). At one point, Cosgrove in fact observes that Doxa is labelled ‘deceptive’ but never ‘false’, but he immediately proceeds to state that he will ‘not make anything of this distinction’ (2014, 16 n. 61). Also pertinent in this connection is Parmenides’ very difficult description of Doxa’s cosmic order (διάκοσμον) as ἐκφυτά πάντα (B8.60). The adjective has been rendered variously, including ‘accurate’, ‘appropriate’, ‘fitting’, ‘plausible’, ‘specious’. After a comprehensive discussion, Bryan 2012, 58-113 concludes that we must allow for an interrelation of different senses. We can appropriate this semantic insight concerning ἐκφυτά in our interpretation: Doxa’s cosmology can be entirely accurate or appropriate insofar as it correctly expounds the nature of Doxastic things, but also misleading or treacherous in its appearance precisely in the same sense that it is ‘deceptive’, i.e. insofar

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Parmenides' conception of the mortal cognitive agent as our starting point for thinking about the relation between the two parts of the poem is defensible not least because Parmenides himself does much the same. The programmatic statement that both *Alētheia* and *Doxa* are to be learned (B1.28b-30) is embedded in a conversation between a goddess and—emphatically—a mortal. The objection raised and addressed in this paragraph is vacuous above all because the theory of mortal cognition advanced in B16 is no more or less deceptive than the very notion of Parmenides as a mortal cognitive agent, to whom the goddess speaks as a mortal cognitive agent, and whose knowledge and beliefs we are trying to explain.

Parmenides' attitude to *Doxa* is, of course, not like that of the ignorant mortals. Parmenides is informed by his knowledge of *Alētheia*. He accepts *Doxa*'s theories qua accounts of Doxastic things, but recognises their inadmissibility as accounts of the unshaken heart of reality, i.e. of what-is and its properties as deduced in B8. Importantly, while Doxastic thinking inexorably characterises the mortal mind in the way analysed above, the mortals criticised in *Alētheia* take a further, avoidable step. Parmenides' references to the human activity of 'naming' illuminate this point. The mortals resolve to 'name' the two Doxastic elements (κατέθεντο... ὄνομάζειν κ.τ.λ., B8.53-5). Since the goddess locates their avoidable error in this action (ἐν φ πεπλανημένοι εἶσιν, B8.54), and associates their 'naming' of each Doxastic thing with an index of Doxastic suppositions (B19), ὄνομάζειν clearly signifies something stronger and more technical than mere labelling. Consistently, the mortal activity of naming (όνομάζειν) involves, not merely the noncommittal labelling of the two Doxastic elements (B8.54), Doxastic things (B19.3) and Doxastic processes (B8.40-1), but the active and avoidable resolve (κατέθεντο, B8.39, 53; B19.3) to embrace such labels as categories which reflect and disclose the fundamental nature of reality: ὄνομ(α)... δοξα βροτοί κατέθεντο πεποιθότες είναι ἀληθή (B8.38-9).58 Parmenides will avoid this avoidable resolve. In this sense, then, Parmenides both advances *Doxa*'s theories as accounts of Doxastic things and keeps them at arm's length.

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58 As it is liable to be mistaken by ignorant mortals for an account which discloses the fundamental reality.

It makes no odds to us whether at B8.38 we read τῷ πάντ' ὄνομ(α) ἔσται (to be translated 'all things will be its name', with Kingsley 2003, 190-1; Mourelatos 2008, 386-7) or, less likely, τῷ πάντ' ὄνομασται ('to it all things will be named', Woodbury 1971). On either construal, the point will be that what-is is in fact the only possible referent for categories which purport to get at and capture the fundamental nature of reality. On mortal naming in *Doxa*, see further Kraus 2013, 486-7.
Scholars often speak as if the thinking described in B16 is a habit, which only characterises ordinary mortal thinking, and which can be broken. Such remarks overlook what we saw was the universalising scope of B16 and the passive determination of the thinking it describes. But the concern behind them is clear enough. If this is mortal thinking, then how was Parmenides able to think differently? If, being a mortal, Parmenides must think in Doxastic categories and through the Doxastic *krisis*, how could he have also thought in the competing categories of *Alētheia* and through its *krisis*? If we previously asked, 'Why did Parmenides write *Doxai*?', we will now ask, 'How could Parmenides have written *Alētheia*?'

How could Parmenides have written *Alētheia*?

The basic point that Parmenides receives a divine disclosure is not enough to solve our problem and explain how a creature mired in the processes described in B16 could have attained the knowledge of *Alētheia*. Our problem is not merely that the mortal *qua* mortal could have no evidence for the doctrine of *Alētheia*. Our problem is, more fundamentally, that the mortal *qua* mortal cannot even think in the categories of *Alētheia*. Human cognition could not grasp and sustain the knowledge of *Alētheia* and its argumentation. In other words, the knower himself must change.

Conceptions of *homoiōsis theōi* as the end of the ideal philosophical life play significant roles in many Greek explorations of theology, epistemology and ethics. A fundamental notion which generally permeates these calls for assimilation to the divine is that human agents are not simply and strictly human. The human being comprises a mixture of divine and non-divine parts or aspects and, correspondingly, capacities. The more one promotes the divine aspects of one's complex identity, the closer one assimilates oneself to divinity in one's cognition and/or character. So, to take one prominent example, the ideal philosopher of Plato's *Timaeus* exercises the divine, rational soul-part within him, attains divine as opposed to human thoughts and cognition (φρονεῖν μὲν ἄθανατα καὶ θεῖα) and so becomes as identical with that part—i.e. as divine—
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as a mortal can (Tim. 90b1-c6). Such philosophical models, it should be noted, take up and develop a pre-existing, pervasive and deep-seated theological attitude—as early as the Iliad—which construes the boundary between the mortal and the divine as a malleable and negotiable one, and which understands the height of mortal excellence as an approximation to, or attainment of, divine qualities or capacities.

The Parmenides who will emerge below espouses what we will rightly call his own model of homoiôsis theôi.

Now, direct doxographic reports on Parmenides’ view of the soul are rare and variant. According to Aëtius’ report, the soul is fiery (πυρώδη, A45). According to Macrobius, it comprises earth and fire (A45). It is not at all clear, then, that Parmenides explicitly discussed the soul’s composition. This is not to say, however, that Parmenides probably did not use the term nor, moreover, that he did not do so in a manner that implied a certain integration of it into his cosmological system. In fact, a consideration of Simplicius’ far more reliable report of a Parmenidean theory of metempsychosis supports Aëtius’ statement against that of Macrobius.

Cf. Plato, Theaetetus 176a8-b2 (ἅμωνικος θεός κατὰ τὸ δικαίωμα); Republic 500c8-d1; Aristotle, EN 10.7, 1177b27-1178a3 (κατὰ τὸ δικαίωμα... ἀνθρώπῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ); with Sedley 1999b, Annas 1999, ch. 3. We can of course cite later Platonic (e.g. Alcineus, Didascaliclus 28.3-4; Plotinus, Enneads 1.2.5-7), Stoic (e.g. Seneca, Ep. 92.3-4; Epicurus, Discourses 2.14.12-13), Epicurean (more idiosyncratically, e.g. Sent. Vat. 33; ep. ad Men. 135.5-9), Lucretius, de rer. nat. 5.8, with Warren 2000; Erler 2002) and Judaeo-Christian (see e.g. Annas 1999, 65-6 n. 37; Russell 2006) variants; cf. Boys-Stones 2009, 15. Cases can be made also for Empedocles and Heraclitus: see Roloff 1970, 180-6; 192-7; Broadie 1999, 219-20; Betegh 2006, 636-7.

Mortal Homeric heroes are standardly θείος (Iliad 2.335; 16.798-9), ἱσάθεος φῶς (Iliad 2.565), δήμων ἵος (Iliad 20.493; 21.18), ἀντίθεος (Iliad 5.629; Odyssey 1.21), θεοείκελος (Iliad 1.131; Odyssey 3.416), ἐπίεικελον ἀθανάτοις (Iliad 11.60), etc. etc. For epic godlikeness, see Roloff 1970, 3-83 and, for later archaic and classical literature, 102-26.

The essential notion that the mortal’s achievement of the rational cognition of Alêtheia involves his divinisation in some way has of course been suggested: Cornford 1952, 120; Roloff 1970, 171-7; Hussey 1990, 37; Göbel 2002, 158-66; Miller 2011, 43-57. These discussions do not relate this notion to the questions about, and the aspects of, Parmenides’ epistemology, psychology and eschatology addressed here, or put it to the interpretive uses suggested below. The general idea that in Alêtheia the mortal transcends a mortal perspective to which he returns in Doxa is also expressed in Adluri 2011, 78-89, although there are no further similarities or overlaps between our accounts and arguments beyond this general thought.

On the Peripatetic statement—or complaint—that Parmenides ‘identified ψυχή and νοῦς’ see n. 51 above.
When expounding Parmenides’ account of Doxa’s goddess, Simplicius writes as follows (in Phys. ix. 39.19-20 Diels = Coxon 1986, Testim. 207):

Parmenides says that she [sc. the goddess] conveys the souls, now from the visible to the invisible, and then back again (τὰς ψυχὰς πέμπειν ποτὲ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐμφανοῦς εἰς τὸ ἄειδές, ποτὲ δὲ ἀνάπαλιν φησιν).

Admittedly, the passage does not confirm beyond doubt that τὰς ψυχὰς reflects Parmenidean phraseology. The important point to recognise, however, is that Simplicius works here very closely indeed from Parmenides’ text. In the previous sentences (in Phys. 38.30-39.18), Simplicius cites verbatim our B13, B12.1-3 and B8.50-61, and soon after (39.27-40.6), B8.26-8 and B8.30-3. He introduces this sentence with φησιν. Most conclusively, in the immediately following sentence, he apologises that he must expound Parmenides at length due to current ignorance of the ancient texts (39.20; note also 144.28: Simplicius cites at length from Parmenides’ treatise because of its rarity). Simplicius thus provides strong and strangely under-discussed evidence that, in a now lost passage, the goddess was explicitly endowed with the eschatological role of cyclically receiving and dispatching ‘souls’ or, minimally, what Simplicius referred to as such in the context of a very close paraphrase. Our discussion above of B16 and its doxographic context, furthermore, indicates one basic way in which this eschatological doctrine of soul-conveyance in Doxa relates to its elemental cosmology. We know that Parmenides considered Hot the mortal’s life-force and death the final ‘departure of fire’ (τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, de sens. 4.5-6) from the Cold body (so that the lifeless corpse is identified with Cold; note also A46a (Aëtius): ageing results from a partial decrease in Hot). The conveyance of souls reported by Simplicius, therefore, coincided with a physiological account of the inception and cessation of life. The evidence suggests, then, a cyclical process (ποτὲ μὲν ... ποτὲ δὲ) whereby the goddess dispatches Hot from one location to the other, where she incarnates it in a Cold body (so that the living mortal comprises a mixture of both Hot and Cold), and dispatches it back to the other location when separating it from the Cold.

That the cyclical conveyance of souls by a goddess, to and fro from the visible to the invisible and vice versa, expresses a doctrine of metempsychosis is clear.66 These Hot souls, which precede the birth of the living mortal and

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66 τὸ ἄειδές is an obvious allusion to ‘Hades’ (as early as Iliad 5.845). Cf. parallel accounts of cyclical metempsychosis, e.g. Graf and Johnston 2007, no. 5 (Thurii: 4th cent.): κύκλο (cf. fr. 229 Kern, κύκλου, with Johnston 2007, 127); Plato, Meno 81b4-5 (τοτὲ μὲν τελευτάν ... τοτὲ δὲ πάλιν γέγρασαν); Pindar fr. 133 M (ap. Plato, Meno 81b8-10): Φερσεφόνα ... ἀνεδίδοι ψυχάς.
survive his death, are not mortal in the same sense that living humans (compounded of both Hot and Cold) are. Indeed, Simplicius makes no suggestion that the cyclical eschatological process was delimited in any way. This theory of metempsychosis, like any such theory, presupposes some notion of the soul's divinity. As Burkert puts it, metempsychosis, by denying that the soul is subject to death (athanatos), renders 'the epithet which since Homer had characterized the gods in distinction from men... the essential mark of the human person'. We may also note that, qua Hot, the Parmenidean soul is also 'aethereal fire' (B8.56) and compare near-contemporary notions of the divine, aethereal soul.

We can now turn to Bi. The proem, I suggest, further supports these conclusions about the soul's physiological makeup and divinity and represents the kouros' attainment of the disposition necessary for acquiring knowledge of Alētheia as a process of cognitive identification with his divine soul.

It is a familiar and uncontroversial point that the journey's topography closely echoes elements of the Hesiodic underworld (Theogony 733 ff). The

...A few pages earlier, Simplicius cites Parmenides' account of sex and birth, which are also administered by the goddess (B12.3-6; Simplicius, in Phys. 31.13-17 = Coxon 1986, Testim. 204). Parmenides, then, constructed a unified account of the goddess's administration of the formation and dissolution of living mortals. Burkert 1972, 284 convincingly relates Parmenides' description here of birth as 'hateful' (στυγερόν, B12.4) to current discourses of metempsychosis.

Burkert 1985, 300; cf. Bremmer 1983, 71-2. Metempsychosis and the soul's divinity are intimately connected e.g. at Plato, Meno διβ3-6 (ψυχήν... ἀθάνατον). That the early Pythagoreans of South Italy advanced notions of metempsychosis and, concomitantly, the divinity of the soul is perhaps the only doctrinal statement that can be made about them without reservation, see esp. Xenophanes 21. By Dk; Ion 36 Bq Dk; Herodotus 2.123; Aristotle, DA 407b20-3; Theophrastus ap. Porphyry, de abstinentia 3.26.1-4; with Burkert 1972, 121-36; Schofield 1991, 25-7 (convincingly arguing that ψυχή was the operative term); Kahn 2001, 18.

The following discussion of B1 will not pursue or rely on any reconstruction of the direction of the kouros' journey (katabasis, anabasis, etc.). It will highlight independently certain features of the journey which any such tenable reconstruction would have to take into account. See Kraus 2013, 453 for the view that the text does not afford enough determinate information to establish the journey's direction.

The δώματα Νυκτός (B1.g), gates of Night and Day (B1.11) and yawning chasm (B1.17-18), inter alia, all have their Hesiodic counterparts; see Burkert 1969, 8, 11-13; Miller 2006, 7-8; Mourelatos 2008, 15; Palmer 2009, 54-5; Kraus 2013, 454; and esp. Pellikaan-Engel 1978, 8-10. Morrison not only identifies these Hesiodic echoes (1955, esp. 50-1), but argues

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appropriation of this topography already indicates that the kouros travels on an eschatological path to the setting of the afterlife. As a scholarly consensus rightly recognises, moreover, the phrase μοίρα κακή (Bi.26) is a formulaic designation for death.71 The goddess, then, highlights that the journey which the kouros has taken through this eschatological scenery is the journey on which one is typically set by death—the journey of the discarnate, post-mortem soul—and impresses upon him his unusual privilege in undertaking that journey while still alive (οὕτω... μοίρα κακή... ἄλλα... τῷ δίκη... Βι.26-8).

That the kouros travels towards his divinisation is already suggested by the description of his path as that of a divinity (ἄδων... δαίμονος, B1.2-3).72 The goddess emphatically states that this path is ‘far from the track of humans’ (ἀνθρώπων, B1.27; cf. άνθρώποι, B16.2-3). This statement itself further explains and amplifies (η γάρ) the immediately preceding identification of the path as that of the post-mortem, discarnate soul (μοίρα κακή x.t.l., B1.26-7). Within Parmenides’ psychological and eschatological system, then, the kouros’ journey is that of the fiery, Hot, Light, aethereal soul. And indeed, the kouros is conveyed by the Heliades—Sun’s Daughters—agents emblematic of fiery Heat, Light and the celestial (cf. B10.1; B11.2) region of aether. The identification of his guides as Heliades recasts Parmenides as a new successful Phaethon, guided safely by the appropriate charioteers (B1.24), and (in yet another sign of divinisation) identifies both the chariot with its blazing axle (αἰθόμενος, B1.7), and the ‘much-promoted’ or ‘much-attending’ horses (B1.4) as those of the Sun.73 Again, the kouros’ journey is that of the divine soul and, fittingly, he is closely related and even assimilated to his divine guides. As Burkert observes,
the appellation κούρε (B1.24) places the traveller on an equal footing with the aforementioned κούραι (B1.9) as their brotherly counterpart.74 This impression is further supported by the portrayal of the kouros as a successful Phaethon and, significantly, by the goddess’s immediately following (B1.24) affirmation that the kouros is closely linked to his divine charioteers: ὃ κόυρ’ ἀθανάτοις συνάορος ἡμίχχεισιν.75 Since the kouros is associated with the Heliadès and travels in the manner of the Sun, it is tempting to find in Parmenides’ concept of the εἶδώς φῶς a punning play on φῶς: the knowing man (φῶς) is a knowing Light (φῶς). In B14, Parmenides makes virtually the same pun by substituting ἀλλότριον φῶς for the Homeric ἀλλότριος φῶς (e.g. Iliad 5.214).76 Our analysis of Parmenides’ conception of the soul permits us to view this pun in the wider framework of his psychology and eschatology. Under the guidance of the Daughters of the Sun, the kouros travels the path of the knowing man, or the knowing light: the kouros journeys to the goddess with—or as—his Hot, fiery, aethereal soul.

Parmenides’ appropriation of the imagery and terminology of mystery initiations, finally, helps to flesh out and corroborate further his association of the acquisition of divine knowledge with the divinisation of the knower. It is itself again a familiar point that, in describing his path as that of the ‘knowing man’ (εἰδότα φῶς, B1.3), and in having the goddess address him as kouros (B1.24), Parmenides is adopting the technical vocabulary of mystery initiations.77 Our sources, furthermore, link mystery initiations with the experience of death (recall the eschatological nature of the kouros’ journey in B1). Pindar writes

74 Burkert 1969, 14 n. 32.
75 συνάορος (literally, bound or yoked together) is a fairly rare term which suggests an appropriate and strong connection: cf. δαιτί συνήορος (sc. φόρμιγξ), Odyssey 8.99; εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάορος, Pindar, Nem. 4.5 (a scholion glosses συνάορος here as συμφερομένη και κοινωνοῦσα, schol. in Pind. Nem. 4.9.1 Drachmann); cf. also Pindar ap. Plato, Republic 331a6-9 (where hope accompanies [ςυναορεί] the just old man). By Classical times, συνάορος signifies close intimacy and often wedlock, e.g. Euripides, Orestes 654, 1356. Coxon 1986, ad loc. renders ‘consort’; cf. Kingsley 1999, 75.
76 For the pun, see Torgerson 2006, 41-2; cf. Kahn 2009, 215. Torgerson 2006, 28-9 observes further that this solitary occurrence of φῶς in Parmenides is also his only reference to a mortal as knowledgeable and that, elsewhere, the term typically refers especially to men of high rank and—most interestingly for our purposes—frequently occurs in the common Homeric epithet ἥθεος φῶς (e.g. Iliad 2.565; Odyssey 1.324).
77 Esp. Burkert 1969, 5 with n. 11; cf. Diels 2003, 49; Jaeger 1947, 98; Bowra 1953, 50-1; Coxon 1986, 159; Kingsley 1999, 62; Palmer 2009, 58; Kraus 2013, 455. See e.g. [Euripides], Rhes. 971-3 (τοῖς εἶδόσιν); Euripides, Bacchae 72-4 (εἰδώς); Aristophanes, Nubes 1241 (τοῖς εἶδόσιν); Andocides, de myet. 30.10 (τοῖς εἶδόσιν); cf. Euripides, TrGF v.2, F78.11-13; Pindar, Ol. 2.85 (note the eschatological theme) and, perhaps more playfully, Plato, Symp. 199a1-2. For the kouros motif as initiatory, see Burkert 1969, 14 n. 32; Kingsley 1999, 71-4.
that, having seen the mysteries (ιδὼν κεῖν'), the initiate knows the end of life (οίδε μέν βίου τελευτάν, fr. 137 Maehler), while Plato invokes the mysteries when recasting philosophy as practising dying during one’s life and so ensuring post-mortem bliss (Phd. 8oe-8ia; 69c). Again, Plutarch compares the soul’s experience at death to the experiences of ‘those celebrating great initiations’ (fr. 178 Sandbach).78

Now, Burkert emphasises that immortality is never mentioned in connection with the Eleusinian initiations, in which death remains an ineluctable reality, although not an absolute end.79 While lifetime deification is admittedly not at issue, Burkert’s emphasis is nonetheless misleading. The eternal and blissful existence which the mysteries guarantee after death amounts to post-mortem divinisation, and has demonstrably been understood as such. The initiates alone can be said to live after death (τοίσδε γαρ μόνοις έκεί ζην εστι, Sophocles, TrGF iv. F837.3-4). In Pindar, again, the initiate knows, not just the end of life, but, crucially, also a divinely-granted beginning (διόσδοτον ἀρχάν, Pindar fr. 137 M). His hopes concern simultaneously the end of life and an eternal life (Isocrates 4.28.10-12). Plato writes that, according to the founders of the mysteries and those who participate in them, initiation aims to ensure that the initiate, i.e. his post-mortem soul, spends eternity among the gods (μετά θεών, Phd. 69c3-7, 8ia8-9). In the Homeric Hymn to Demeter, Metaneira, by misinterpreting Demeter’s good intention to deify Demophon, interrupts the process of apotheosis so that death must remain ineluctable (2.260-3).80 Nonetheless, the mysteries which Demeter proceeds to establish may be said, in keeping with these texts, to substitute her initial intention to bestow lifetime deification (480-2).

The most expansive of the Golden Tablets, some of which are very close to Parmenides in time, place, language and imagery, are especially reminiscent of Bi and offer a significant corroboration.81 Like the kouros, the initiate’s soul journeys to the setting of the afterlife where it encounters guardians who, once it speaks the appropriate words, admit it to an audience with an eschatological

78 Cf. also Aristides 22.2 Keil; Aeschylus, TrGF iii. F387; Apuleius, Metamorphoses 11.21.26-7 (ad instar voluntariae mortis); 11.23.28-31 (accessi confinium mortis).
80 Demophon already grew δαίμονι ἴσος (235) and godlike (241), and would have become ἀγήρων τ’ ἀθάνατόν τε (242).
81 On the Tablets in general, see Graf and Johnston 2007; Bernabé and Cristóbal 2008; Edmonds 2011. References below are to the Graf and Johnston edition [gj].
The goddess is sometimes left unnamed and sometimes identified explicitly as Persephone. Like Parmenides’ eschatological goddess, she comports herself ‘kindly’ to the initiate (πρόφρων). The eschatological path of the kouros, the path of the post-mortem soul (δάδον ... τήνδ’ ὄδόν, B1.2, 5, 27), recalls, therefore, what our earliest and longest Tablet from Hipponion describes as the ‘sacred path (δαδόν ... ἱεράν) on which also other glorious initiates and bac-choi travel’. It is noteworthy, then, that in many of these Tables, the soul’s eschatological journey culminates in an explicit articulation of the divinisation which I argued is important if more implicit in Greek accounts of mysteries elsewhere. In several fourth-century South Italian Tablets, the initiate finally states to the unnamed goddess: ‘for I also claim to be of your blessed race (υμών γένος),’ and / or is addressed by her: ‘you will be a god instead of a mortal (θεός δ’ έσηι άντι βροτοΐο);’ ‘you have become a god instead of a human (θεός έγένου εξ άνθρωπου).’

Unlike the initiate in the Tablets, the kouros is, pointedly, not yet dead (B1.26). Parmenides appropriates traditional religious models of this kind creatively and cannot be simply assimilated to them (pace Kingsley 1999). Our analysis of Parmenides’ appropriation of the language and imagery of mystery initiations further substantiates the same conclusion—at which we first arrived through an internal evaluation of the evidence—that he frames the kouros’ eschatological journey to the goddess as one which takes its culmination to be a transformative divinisation of the mortal through an identification with his divine soul.

82 See e.g. GJ.8 (Sicily, ca. 3rd cent.); GJ.5 (South Italy [Thurii], 4th cent.); also GJ.1 (South Italy [Hipponion] late 5th cent.), where the same scene culminates in an interview with a chthonic king (13), although some editors read βασιλεί<αι> (Bernabé and Cristóbal 2008, 48-9).

83 Unnamed: e.g. GJ.5: 8-9; ‘Persephone’: e.g. GJ.6-7; 26a-b. It is neither warranted nor illuminating to identify therefore Parmenides’ unnamed goddess as Persephone, contra Kingsley 1999, 94. Parmenides’ goddess cannot (pace Palmer 2009,58-9; cf. also Morrison 1955) be ‘Night’ (in B8.59, she would be denigrating herself). Initiatory divinities are standardly unnamed, see Rohde 1925, 185, n. 19; Burkert 1969, 13-14 with n. 31. πρόφρων: GJ.7.7; 6.7 (South Italy [Thurii], 4th cent.); cf. Kingsley 1999, 64.

84 GJ.115-16 (South Italy [Hipponion], late 5th cent.): for this parallel in imagery with B1 and on the cultic and poetic image of the path, see Feyerabend 1984.

85 GJ.5:3; 6.3; 7.3 (South Italy [Thurii], 4th cent.). Cf. also έμοι γένος ούράνιον, GJ.2.6-7; 8.12, 13; 29.3-4; etc., with Johnston 2007, 114-16, 124.

86 GJ.5:9 (South Italy [Thurii], 4th cent.); one immediately recalls Empedocles 31 B12.4-6 DK.

87 GJ.3:4 (South Italy [Thurii], 4th cent.); cf. the later GJ.9.2-4 (Rome, 2nd or 3rd cent. CE).
4 Conclusions

We must now turn to draw our conclusions, from the foregoing discussions, concerning the distinctive nature and role of this divinisation in Parmenides’ thought.

Parmenides identifies as the essence and conceptual basis of Doxa’s cosmology the very same krisis between the two Doxastic elements in accordance with which specifically human cognition (ἀνθρώποισι, B16.2-3) functions by brute, physiological necessity. It is the competing krisis between ‘is’ and ‘is not’ which structures the argumentation of Alêtheia and its concept of what-is. How, then, was it also possible and appropriate for Parmenides, being a mortal, to transcend such human thinking and attain the knowledge of Alêtheia? Our analysis of Doxa’s psychology, physiology and eschatology, and of the kouros’ journey in Bi, yields the conclusion that Parmenides does not conceive of the human agent as an agent who is simply and strictly human. The mortal, for Parmenides, is a complex hybrid, which comprises both divine and mortal parts. In attaining the disposition which is necessary for acquiring knowledge of what-is, as this process is figured in Bi, the living kouros is divinised. He journeys to the goddess as the divine, Hot, aethereal soul within him. With a view to Parmenides’ hierarchical contrasts between the divergent mental qualities of Hot and Cold, in identifying himself with his divine soul the kouros identifies himself with a purely Hot and, therefore, supremely vital, healthy, acute, effective and active sort of cognitive agent.88 Greek initiation is always and everywhere transformative, and it is the divine which facilitates the initiate’s transformation. The epistemological thrust of the encounter between the kouros and the goddess is, I suggest, the following. The goddess’s injunctions and arguments throughout Alêtheia repeatedly enjoin the kouros to think and cognise in ways, and through categories, which his own mortal mind could not have identified, recognised or articulated, and guide him in doing so. The mortal is able to heed the goddess’s injunctions and to follow her guidance only because there is in him a non-mortal, divine part, which can be responsive to such injunctions and such guidance. The process of following the goddess’s injunctions and arguments is a process of becoming cognitively identified

88 For the superiority of the mental activity of a Hotter constitution, recall Theophrastus, de sens. 3.4 (βελτίω δὲ καὶ καθαρωτέραν τὴν [sc. διάνοιαν] διὰ τὸ θερμόν); also on memory and forgetfulness: de sens. 4.1-2, with Parmenides A46a-b. On this point, cf. Vlastos 1946, 72, 68; Bredlow 2011, 255-6. Bredlow interestingly relates to one another the mental superiority of Light in Parmenides, the velocity of light, and the space-and-time defying velocity of abstract thought.
with one’s divine soul to the temporary suspension of the mortal parts and aspects of one’s composite mortal mind. It is in gradually acquiring the ability to register and evaluate Alētheia’s qualitatively different kind of thought that the kouros thus undergoes a process of cognitive homoioïsis theôi.

If we can account in this way for a mortal’s ability to sustain non-mortal thought by invoking our divine Hot soul, this does not mean that we can align what-is with Hot/Light as opposed to Cold/Night. We saw (in Section 2 above) that the Aristotelian ontological identification or even alignment of Light with what-is is fundamentally ill-conceived, and Vlastos’ statement that ‘the positive self-identity of fire [sc. which the knower thinks] . . . is Being’ is unacceptable.89 Pace Vlastos, the heavier and denser Night is not, unlike Light, only somehow apparently ‘positive’. Recall, moreover, that Parmenides is at pains to emphasise that, unlike the self-identity of what-is (B8.49), the self-identity of each Doxastic element is inextricably related to its contradistinction from the other (B8.57-8). That said, our analysis here of Parmenides’ psychology and eschatology, and of B1, has led us to the view—which is also suggested by Vlastos—that, when the mortal knower thinks what-is, he is thinking with a mind that is pure light and divested entirely of darkness. Furthermore, on the basis of our discussion of the nature of Alētheia’s krisis as contrasted with Doxa’s krisis, we may suggest one sense in which such a pure Hot cognitive constitution appears to be structurally suited to thinking in terms of Alētheia’s krisis. Alētheia’s krisis involves retaining one side (‘is’) and rejecting the other (‘is not’). Doxa’s krisis, conversely, involves retaining both elements and essentially relating each one to its enantiomorphic counterpart. When we think purely with our Hot soul, however, we cognise only Hot and no longer any Cold: we thus adopt a physiological frame-of-mind in which we cognise only one thing without its opposite.90 Vlastos suggests, in a similar vein, that the mortal comes to grasp what-is when he thinks pure Light as something completely changeless and stable.91

Both Plato and Aristotle, for whom homoioïsis theôi similarly means identifying ourselves with what is divine in us, relate such divinisation to our capacity for reasoning and contemplation. In this respect, as in many others, they are the descendants of Parmenides. For Parmenides, when we apply our mind to rational contemplation of Alētheia’s krisis between ‘is’ and ‘is not’ and to its argumentative reasoning (κρίναι δέ λόγω, B7.5), this amounts to suppressing

89 Vlastos 1946, 73-4 with n. 45 (my emphasis).
90 I thank Gábor Betegh for this observation.
91 Vlastos 1946, 72, followed by Kahn 2009, 217 with n. 10. Vlastos simply explains away the prima facie paradoxical implications of B16 concerning mortal thinking by untenably dismissing it as a doctrine only of non-cognitive sense-perception, cf. n. 35 above.

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our uncontrollable, passively-determined, sensory mortal cognition and thinking instead with—or as—our divine souls. For the Parmenides who emerged here, a human's mind can reason about 'is' and 'is not', but it is then a divinised and no longer a human mind, thinking in non-human, divine ways and attaining non-human, divine knowledge.92 Significantly, the goddess also enjoins the kouros to convey her disclosure once he had heard it (κόμισαι δὲ σὺ κ.τ.λ., B2.1).93 Her many second-person addresses and injunctions have the effect of placing the reader in the kouros' role. Through his encounter with the goddess, then, the kouros produces a text which, by reprising this encounter, is to effect the same cognitive homoiōsis theōi in its audience. For us, no less than for Parmenides himself, the process of attending to the goddess's guidance and injunctions, and of coming to grasp and contemplate the qualitatively different sort of rational thought and argumentation developed in Alētheia, involves coming to think with, or as, our divine souls. None of this, of course, implies that we or Parmenides are deified pure and simple, so that we can simply dispense with Doxastic thinking. Despite momentary achievements of such cognitive homoiōsis theōi and the ability to apply our mind to contemplation of 'is' and 'is not', we remain living mortals. We remain constrained in the course of our lives to experience, and to think and form first-order judgements about, multiple, mobile differentiated things in accordance with contrasts between the two sensible enantiomorphic opposites. The ineluctability and appropriateness of Doxastic cognition to the mortal and to mortal life is no less part of the teachings of the goddess than Alētheia. As Plato and Aristotle will later prescribe, Parmenides strove to become divine insofar as this is possible for a mortal.

Finally, we may suggest a way in which the foregoing discussion allows us to account for the emphatic prominence in the poem of both the goddess's divine disclosure and Alētheia's argumentative reasoning. In progressing along his journey, the kouros is repeatedly characterised as the dependent object of the guidance and transportation of his divine guides (e.g. με χέρουσιν... μ' ἐς ὀδόν βήσαν... φερόμην... κουραι δ' ὀδόν ἡγεμόνευαν κ.τ.λ., B1.1-5, cf. 15-17). The culmination of the journey is, of course, the goddess's divine disclosure (which will comprise the rest of the poem, B1.23 onwards). This is perhaps unsurprising. Could a human mind, mired in the passively-determined, uncontrollable physiological processes described in B16, have pulled itself up by its own boot-

92 Lesher 2008, 473-6, then, is on my view precisely wrong to claim that Parmenides championed the reasoning of 'the human mind' and sought to 'humanize knowledge' (my emphases). Specifically human cognition is analysed in B16. It is Doxastic cognition.
Straps? At the same time, as we saw, the kouros is able to heed and follow the guidance of this divine power which he encounters through the divine part in him which can be responsive to such guidance. Far from demanding passive acceptance, the goddess bombards the kouros with injunctions to engage his mind in a critical evaluation of her disclosure (especially B7.5). Indeed, the tenets of Alētheia could not have been communicated to a piously obedient but uncritical human mind. It is only by mastering Alētheia's argumentative reasoning, by actively applying his liberated understanding to the krisis 'is' / 'is not', that the kouros can register, evaluate and accept its account of the unshaken heart of reality.

This paper has attempted to shed some light on what I called at the outset the aetiological and epistemological questions by pursuing them in relation to each other. In this way, my discussion here sought to further our understanding of several key aspects of Parmenides' thought: his impetus and rationale for developing and including Doxa, his conception of the mortal epistemic agent in relation both to the investigations in Doxa and to those in Alētheia, and the role of the relation between mortal and divine in his poem. It was not part of the scope or ambition of this paper to develop or advance a particular line concerning what I called the ontological question, i.e. concerning how we might view the precise status of Doxastic things in the light of Alētheia's doctrine or the precise nature of the relation between Doxastic things and ultimate reality, i.e. what-is. As we saw in Section 1 above, moreover, in the light of Parmenides' pejorative framing of Doxa, a resolution to the ontological question will not by itself yield an answer to the aetiological question, i.e. an explanation of why Doxa is there. In pursuing the epistemological and aetiological questions in relation to each other, however, we of course did not set aside any and all consideration of Alētheia's account of what-is. In the course of the arguments advanced above, certain limited but important, pertinent points have been established, which any viable resolution to the ontological question will have to take into account. Doxastic things, we saw, are manifestly available for experience, discussion and belief. The goddess speaks of, and to, Doxastic things (mortals). We can speak of Doxastic things and, furthermore, we can describe them correctly and incorrectly. Indeed, one can acquire knowledge of the nature of Doxastic things and processes (B16). Doxa describes such things correctly. It correctly expounds their origins, natures and behaviours by tracing them to (interactions between) the two constitutive principles which underlie them. It correctly explains, for example, the human mind (B16) and procreation (B17:18). Whatever else we say in response to the ontological question, then, Parmenides clearly takes it that there are present such things as mortals, who can experience, be experienced, err, know and be spoken to and about.
He is in some sense committed to the presence and availability of Doxastic things and processes, which can be experienced, spoken and thought about, and known and expounded correctly or incorrectly. At the same time, what-is is aligned with \( \alpha\lambda\varepsilon\theta\varepsilon \), understood as the core or ultimate reality, and the kouros' attitude to Doxa is informed by his knowledge of Alëtheia. He accepts Doxa's theories as accounts of Doxastic things and processes. But he also recognises that beliefs about, and accounts of, Doxastic things have no place in an account of what-is. Indeed, the mortals' error consists not least in mistaking Doxastic accounts for accounts of the nature of the core or ultimate reality, and Doxa's cosmology is 'deceptive' precisely insofar as it is liable to be misinterpreted in just this way.

To be sure, within the parameters set by these limited points, many different stories could be told about the precise nature of the relation between what-is—'the unshaken heart of reality'—and Doxastic things. This paper did not undertake to elaborate a particular story of that nature nor—beyond the limited points identified above—do its arguments rely on any such particular elaboration. It sought rather to identify and to follow a further, complementary but different perspective from which the question of the relation between the two parts of Parmenides' poem can be profitably pursued.

References

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94 Doxastic things, then, cannot be non-existent 'appearances' or 'illusions'. Indeed, there would \textit{ex hypothesi} be nothing there either to generate or to experience the illusion e.g. that this man moves or that mortals name things. For further criticisms, see Palmer 2009, 181-3.

95 For some recent approaches which may be considered in this connection, see e.g. de Rijk 1983; Nehamas 2002, 62-3; Palmer 2009, 45-188; Thanassas 2011, 291-4; Pulpito 2011, 203-6; Mourelatos 2008, pp. xlv-xliv; 2011, 184-9. In a different vein, Cosgrove 2014, 10, 13, 15, 24-5 suggests that Parmenides paves the way towards, but does not yet himself articulate clearly or assert, a degrees of reality worldview, later fully worked out by Plato and Aristotle. (Against Cosgrove's position on the question of the status of Doxa's theories as accounts of Doxastic things, however, see above Sections 1 and 2.)


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