Protagoras and Instrumentality of Religion

It is reported that Protagoras began one of his works, On the gods, with a strong, even provocative statement: “About the gods, I am not able to know whether they exist or do not exist, nor what they are like in form; for the things preventing knowledge are many: the obscurity [of the subject] and the brevity of human life”.¹ The statement appeared so controversial to his contemporaries that Protagoras was accused of atheism and his book was publicly burned. Regrettably, only this one sentence survived from the work, and it is difficult to say how the argument developed afterwards. But judging just from this fragment, the accusation of atheism is far too strong. In this fragment, Protagoras does not make an ontological but an epistemological statement. He does not know whether the gods exist or not, which does not mean that he denies the gods’ existence. He pronounces his inability to have definite knowledge concerning this theological issue, but he leaves open a possibility that some positive pronouncements about the gods can be made. However, these pronouncements would not qualify as knowledge. Not knowing how it is with the existence of the gods, Protagoras does not know what they look like, either. It is obvious that in making this statement Protagoras relies on the popular concept of the gods, in particular, their immortality. If there is one thing that distinguishes the gods from humans, according to traditional religion, it is their immortality. Gods were generated, but there is no end to their existence. This basic fact about the gods seems to be reflected in the reason Protagoras gives for his lack of knowledge about the gods, which is brevity of human life.² Had humans lived longer, would they have been able to acquire some knowledge about the gods? How long would be long enough? Any finite length of human existence would be vanishingly small in comparison with the infinity of the existence of the gods. On the other hand, why this would be an issue?³ Protagoras probably would agree that the sky and the sea are incomparably older than any of the humans and yet humans accumulated a great deal of positive knowledge about meteorology, astronomy, navigation, and the like to be able to use this knowledge in everyday life. Would it be possible to acquire at least partial knowledge about the gods through generations of theological investigations? Presumably, problems like this are addressed by Protagoras later in his book.

¹ Diogenes Laertius IX, 51 and Eusebius, Praep. ev. XIV, 3, 7 = B4.
³ It may very well be that the reference to short life simply means that “it does not make sense to wait for a confirming personal experience”, as proposed by J. Mansfeld, “Protagoras on epistemological obstacles and persons”, in G.B. Kerferd (ed.), The Sophists and their legacy, Wiesbaden, 1981, p. 42.
We know even less, if anything, about another reason for Protagoras’ lack of theological knowledge, the obscurity (δόνηλοτης) of the subject. In what respect is the subject more obscure than any other subject? The term δόνηλος gained currency in the Hellenistic period as terminus technicus, but it was used in a technical or semi-technical sense also in the fifth century as describing things not perceived by the senses. The gods of mythology certainly were perceived by the senses, but hardly any Greek could claim that he saw or heard a god. If gods could be seen, it was only because they chose to be visible and audible in any form they wanted, which points to a different nature of the gods. If they can choose to appear in one form now and in another the next time, it means that their visible form is not really their form. There is an invisible nature that can manifest itself in various appearances, and humans have no access to this nature. Therefore, if gods exist, their nature can be considered so different from human nature that humans would not be able to fathom the gods. But this would mean that some knowledge about the gods is accessible, after all. Protagoras would know enough about the gods to state that no more knowledge about them can be acquired. Even negative theology assumes some positive knowledge, scanty as it may be. That is, Protagoras does have some knowledge about the gods. He knows why their existence and nature cannot be investigated by human means, and he is able to give reasons for the impossibility of scientific theology. If so, he is not as devoid of theological knowledge as fr. B4 may make us believe. As befits a Sophist teacher, he has better knowledge than others about things, and with respect to theology, he knows his limits, he knows that the gods are truly different than humans, so different that they are beyond human understanding. In this way, fr. B4 can be read as a token of humility, of keen realization that there are limits of human knowledge and humans should not be so presumptuous as to try to violate these limits by assuming that they are able to know more than their cognitive apparatus allows them to know.

However, such a charitable interpretation of Protagoras’ agnosticism would be far from satisfactory for his contemporaries. True, there was no religious canon in Greece, no sacred scriptures, no fixed religious dogma or priestly hierarchy. But the reality of the gods was undisputed. The gods were protectors of cities and guarantors of morality and the law. Questioning their reality, even in the humblest of spirits, was questioning the foundation of the city or social and moral order. Therefore, founded or not, the accusation of atheism was only to be expected.

Besides On the gods, Protagoras wrote at least one more treatise that discussed religious matters, On those in Hades. This means that Protagoras was seriously interested in the problem of religion and addressed the obvious fact that religion exists and is a potent psychological and social force. Because none of these works survived, his views on religion may be gleaned from Plato’s account of Protagoras’ speech presented in the Protagoras. Although it is doubtful that Plato recounts an actual speech, it seems quite certain that the speech is based on actual views of

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5 As Diogenes of Oenoanda put it forcefully in his non sequitur, Protagoras “said that he did not know whether gods exist, but this amounts to saying that he knows they do not exist” (A23).
Protagoras and may quote at times his actual words from his actual speeches or conversations and works. Protagoras was a well-known personality of his time, and it would be unlikely that Plato would simply use his name in the dialog to put in his mouth words incongruent with his views. There is always a possibility that the words of the dialog are primarily Plato’s interpretation of Protagoras rather than untainted views of Protagoras, but this cannot be determined.6

Protagoras’ speech in the Protagoras has two parts, a myth and an argument. In a mythical account of the genesis of man, Protagoras states that gods existed first and they molded living beings from physical materials and then Epimetheus and Prometheus were put in charge of giving each of these beings proper abilities (swiftness, hides, claws, etc.). Epimetheus did the job at first by himself, but he ran out of abilities so nothing was left for men. Therefore, Prometheus stole from Athena wisdom, and fire from Hephaestus. So it appears that absentmindedness of Epimetheus, “who was not very wise” (321b), was beneficial for humans since, otherwise, they would be just as other animals, made fit to live and survive through natural endowment only. Through Prometheus’ sense of responsibility, the job is completed by giving men the divine attribute of wisdom and no less divine gift of fire. The fact that Prometheus had to steal wisdom and fire indicates that it was not the gods’ original intention to make humans any different than other animals. Prometheus steals what is divine and gives it to men, thereby elevating them above the animal level. From the perspective of the gods, the lack of scruples in resorting to a rather nondivine stratagem was not wise, either, for which Prometheus had to pay dearly. It is just ironic – the irony probably intended by Protagoras – that through unwise handling by a god of the distribution of abilities and unwise handling by another god of the acquirement of the gifts, divine wisdom becomes man’s endowment. Because two gods were not too wise, humans can be wise. Humans will later be able to justly prosecute theft and other crimes because of the gift of wisdom that was stolen and handed to them.

An ironic treatment of the gods in Protagoras’ myth indicates that the myth is just a myth, a story not to be treated in all seriousness when it comes to the matter of the divine.7 If the story is considered non mythically, it seems that Protagoras conveys a view that humans are just a lucky accident of some unspecified natural development. They are not simply animals because of the wisdom they posses and the ability – an art – of handling fire. Other animals are truly unreasoning beings (τὰ ἄλογα, 321c), but humans, as much as they are rational, are divine – they have “kinship with the god” (322a). Humans recognized that kinship from the very

6 Such a possibility leads some researchers to the opinion that the myth in the Protagoras “is plainly the composition of Plato and not of Protagoras”, P. SHOREY, What Plato said, Chicago, 1933, p. 124, and that “Plato himself is responsible for the most of the content of the speech” of Protagoras, W. PRIOR, “Protagoras’ great speech and Plato’s defense of Athenian democracy”, in V. CASTON, D.W. GRAHAM (eds.), Presocratic philosophy, Aldershot, 2002, p. 322.

7 There is an opinion that Protagoras’ myth is really an expression of true piety, M. LOUIS, Doctrines religieuses des philosophes grecs, Paris, 1909, p. 47.
beginning, and the first act of the human race was to worship the gods by erecting altars and making images of the gods. This is a remarkable statement in light of fr. B4. It can be claimed that the primal man possessed an insight unavailable to Protagoras in knowing the form of the gods. On the other hand, Protagoras could claim that lacking any special insight concerning the form of the gods, primal man made their images anyway.

What images would that be? It is not unlikely to suppose that they would be images of men. If humans recognize their wisdom as the divine in themselves, they would recognize that animals are nonrational and thus hardly worthy of worship. The first expression of wisdom is thus religion, and in that sense wisdom is a divine gift. This could be considered an indication that for Protagoras the divine sphere was not altogether mythical. The gods so created humans – by a happy accident or otherwise – that the humans should worship them. The divine in humans directs them immediately and unmistakably to the gods. The gift of wisdom is also a gift – or an instinct – of religion. The first manifestation of wisdom in a wise creature is to worship the divine. Protagoras does not elaborate on the subject and does not explicitly state that the worship was not done to entreat the gods’ protection, but it was a simple worship for worship’s sake, impartial and pure. It may simply be Protagoras’ way of saying that this is what worship should be, wherever it is exercised. The view of worship for worship’s sake is all the more probable because there does not appear to be any utilitarian reason for religious worship in the initial stages of the human race. Why worship? What advantage does it offer in the struggle for survival in the midst of the wild world? Protagoras offers no explanation.

The emergence of humanity is punctuated by the exercise of religion. The divine in humans finds its expression by, in the opinion of first humans, paying homage to the gods through what is the gods’, namely wisdom. Humans, rational beings, are thus naturally religious beings, endowed with a religious instinct that needs to be exercised properly. Whether the universal existence of this instinct can be considered a proof for the existence of the divine is another matter. Protagoras’ agnosticism would not be irreconcilable with using it as a weak proof. Others used it as a strong proof, to mention only the Stoics.

The fact that religious instinct is primary in humans can be seen from the order in which other manifestations of wisdom appeared. Protagoras says that after worship of the gods, humans developed language, building houses, making cloths, and processing foods. The first acts of wisdom in humans are very specific to humans:

8 Protagoras “had given a rational explanation for the state, but not for religion”. Therefore, it can be supposed that he “considered the state and the laws, but not – like the later Sophists – the gods to be the invention of men”, H. Niehues-Pröbsting, Der Kynismus des Diogenes und der Begriff des Zynismus, Frankfurt, 1979, p. 70.

9 It is not at all obvious that Protagoras meant here not temporal succession, but an indication of importance, as suggested by C.W. Müller, “Protagoras über die Götter”, Hermes 95 (1967), p. 143, note 2; H. Sauppe, “Commentaries”, in PLATO, Protagoras, Boston, 1889, p. 67. But even if such interpretation of the “first-then” clause is accepted, the preeminence of religion remains uncontested, cf. C.C.W. Taylor, “Commentaries”, in PLATO, Protagoras,
religion and language. It would be interesting to know how Protagoras would explain how these two endowments could develop naturally, without supernatural intervention, before anything else. He could claim that in the natural state, humans used natural dwellings (e.g., caves) and unprocessed foods, and then somehow wisdom emerged manifesting itself by religious practices and language and only later by such technical skills of carpentry, weaving, cookery, etc.

Wisdom given by Prometheus is wisdom of practical arts and skills (ἡ ἐντεχνὸς σοφία, 321d). Is religion just a technical skill? Such a skill is indispensible in making images of the gods, but it appears to be somewhat insufficient to decide what these images should represent. Therefore, some thinking process is required to make this decision. However, the process could be reduced to mere skillfulness if it is claimed that the images of the gods were imprinted in the minds of the humans, and it was just a matter of skillfulness to make physical images of the mental models. Later, the images faded away from human minds so that humans became expositors of the Protagorean stance expressed in fr. B4. And language? Is it just a skill comparable to making tents and cooking a stew? This, in fact, is not impossible. Generating names and putting together phrases and sentences can be attributed to linguistic competence embedded in entechnos sophia. Protagoras himself was interested in an analysis of language, but this analysis of language is another matter and is a work of a theoretician and, according to Protagoras, there is probably no room for such investigation at the dawn of humanity.

The existence of religious expression could, with some effort, be reduced to a mere skill, to inborn automatism, if not only religious instinct but also knowledge about the appearance of the gods is considered inborn. In building shelters, humans could imitate what they saw in nature. In making images of gods, the religious instinct may have forced them to look into the mirror in their search for the physical model of the divine. Art and skill or not, religious practices are the first thing humans do, even if there appears to be no practical justification for them in the tough world they live in. Religion begins with humans; humans begin with religion. Protagoras recognizes man as a religious being, and at the same time he expresses his disinterest in discussing theology. Humans are religious beings, but it is doubtful whether an agnostic Sophist can explain the role of religion at that stage of human development.

Oxford, 1976, p. 84; O. Gigon, “Studien zu Platons Protagoras”, in Phyllobolia, Basel, 1946, p. 127, says that religion and language constitute a “fixed pair” as exemplified in Lucretius, V. 71-75. However, Lucretius clearly considers development of religion to follow emergence of language, so Protagoras’ pair is not too fixed for Lucretius.

This entechnos sophia is the source of the δημιουργικὴ τέχνη mentioned in 322b.

If so supposed, the view of tabula rasa could not be ascribed to the Sophists, at least not to Protagoras, as proposed by J. de Romilly, The Great Sophists in Periclean Athens, Oxford, 1992, p. 131-132.

Müller, l.c. (n. 9), p. 147, appears to be of similar opinion when he states that “as far as Platonic myth allows for such a conclusion, Protagoras seems to have viewed religion as a fact that is simply given with the existence of man or the nature of his spirit”.

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without taking into account the content of religion. Reduction of religion to its sociological and political dimension can hardly count as an explanation of its importance at the stage of human development when no polis existed and society was at best limited to small groups. However, it appears that for Protagoras the issue was nonproblematic.

With wisdom and fire and the skills developed through them, humans were at a disadvantage. To enable their survival, the intervention of Zeus himself was required to endow them with a gift that lead to the development of civilization: the gift of justice and respect/shame (οἰδός). These two gifts were a glue of sorts that transformed scattered groups and families into polis societies so that through coordinated group activity humans were able to screen themselves from the danger of the animal world. Natural human gifts were insufficient to help small groups blend into societies. The divine on the level of an individual had to be supplemented by the divine on the societal level.

Justice and respect thus indirectly become potent weapons against the animal world. Because humans can cooperate, they become efficient in their struggle with the wild. The intervention of Zeus seems to indicate that the cooperation of humans is more difficult to accomplish than making individual humans. Society is truly a new quality, not less – even more – divine than the quality of wisdom. Justice and respect have to be universal gifts to play the intended role. Cooperation is impossible if the gift for cooperation is missing in participants of the cooperating whole. Cooperation means raising oneself above pure self-interest and taking into account the interest of others. It means a measure of selfless behavior even if no one is watching. It means respect for others even if the others are not blood relatives. It means the universal presence of moral sense, of moral behavior for the sake of morality itself. This is really a divine gift because man’s natural predilection seems to be interest in one’s own interest, even if someone is watching.

Rationality, if only practical, makes humans human. However, rationality by itself is insufficient for human survival. There is the next level, namely morality. Rational dimension is historically followed by the moral dimension, and the latter is what makes humans fully human. Through the development of full humanity, through the development of moral sense, scattered human groups can coalesce and form...
lasting groups powerful enough to repel outside dangers. Morality and moral behavior are the source of strength. Strength is in number, but number, the existence of societies, is impossible without concessions made by individuals for the benefit of social cohesion. And this is impossible without moral sense. The phrase *homo sapiens* thus does not convey the fullness of humanness of human beings. Humans are human only partially through rationality. They become fully so through morality, and this truly required close supervision of Zeus himself to make it reality. The work could not be delegated to lesser gods whose wisdom is wanting. Morality is thus not the result of an accident. It is built on rationality and, in a nonmythical interpretation, is the necessary consequence of the existence of rationality. Rationality is a necessary prerequisite of morality, a vehicle through which morality can be developed. The moral sense is permanent. Its significance can be suppressed, people can become immoral in their lives, but they do not thereby eliminate the moral sense. It is always there, if only dormant. Therefore, Protagoras feels justified in saying that “everyone ought to claim to be just, whether they are or not, and it is madness not to pretend to justice since one must have some trace of it or not be human” (323c). Every human being has a potential for acting justly and the denial of such an ability is a denial of one’s humanity. In a way, Protagoras encourages hypocrisy, but a claim that one acts morally may be considered a means of self-education. Education is a process of molding a pupil in a certain fashion. Why not through claiming that one is just if it may lead to true manifestation of justice? Furthermore, as stated by La Rochefoucauld, hypocrisy is the homage which vice renders to virtue; therefore, Protagoras’ call for hypocrisy need not be altogether repulsive.

In the argument that follows the myth, Protagoras says that “the virtue of a man” (ἀνδρὸς ἀρετή) must be common to all citizens and that the virtue encompasses justice, moderation (σωφροσύνη), and holiness (ὁσιός εἶναι, 325a). Holiness, understood as “showing the proper attitude (sc. in thought, word, and action) towards the gods”, is an indispensable element that assures the proper functioning of society. *Andros aretē* is not immutable and not equally strong in all humans. It is not only a

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16 A similar view can be detected in the statement that the relation between the rulers and the ruled is determined by “reasonableness directed by αἰτία and δίκη, embodied in morals and laws”, D. LOENEN, *Protagoras and the Greek community*, Amsterdam, 1942, p. 18-19.

17 It is, therefore, true that *sophia* is “an obvious prerequisite” of political expertise, although not mentioned explicitly by Protagors, but it does not seem correct to see society as merely a result of “a long process of trial and error”, as proposed by TAYLOR, o.c. (n. 9), p. 81, 82. Also, as stressed by Dietz, for the first time in the European history of ideas, knowledge is explicitly distinguished from ethics and social behavior, K.M. DIETZ, *Protagoras von Abdera*, Bonn, 1976, p. 126.

18 Another way of stating it is the opinion that justice and respect/shame “are normative in character” and “man as a creature born for social life is bound to keep to the rules and morals that are current in his κοινωνία”, LOENEN, o.c. (n. 16), p. 119.

19 TAYLOR, o.c. (n. 9), p. 96; LOENEN, o.c. (n. 16), p. 29. Although *hosiotes* is parallel to *aidos*, the latter term is free of religious connotations, whereas the former term “can be understood only in the religious context”, L. BRISON, “Le mythe de Protagoras. Essai d’analyse structurale”, *QUCC* 20 (1975), p. 31, note 101.
universal attribute but also a fragile one and thus has to be nurtured, particularly by the educational process in which punishment plays no small role. As part of this educational process, it has to be instilled in children as soon as they can understand what is pious and what is impious (325d). It is obvious for Protagoras that all citizens ought to be religious and moral, hopefully, in their inner disposition, but at least in their outward behavior. For Protagoras, it does not require any substantiation to say that impiety (ἀσέβεια), just as much as injustice, is an evil opposed to civic virtue (323e). Religion is considered in the argument purely as part of social engineering. There is no interest in, no discussion of the validity of the religious claims. Citizens of the Protagorean city of Protagoras' argument apparently espouse his agnostic conviction that discussion of the nature of the gods is at best a fruitless effort. The city functions properly due in large part to the exercise of religious practices. Therefore, children should be brought up in a religious spirit to be good citizens. Religion is part of everyday life and should be perpetuated in this role. That this is not just a theoretical statement for Protagoras is exemplified by his requirement that his pupils make a statement under oath in a temple concerning the proper fee for his teaching (328c).20

The discussed views on religion have to be confronted with the homo mensura statement with which the name of Protagoras is identified much more closely than with the agnosticism of fr. B4. Protagoras says that "man is a measure of all things, of those that are that they are, and of those that are not that they are not".21 As expressed by Socrates, the statement means, "as each thing appears to me so it is to me, and as it appears to you, so it is to you" (152a, Crat., 385e). However, this does not lead to complete epistemological anarchy. The Sophist goal is to be useful to the city and the city's opinion prevails over the view of an individual citizen. For "whatever seems just and right to a city is really just and right to it so long as it believes to be so" (Theaet., 177d, 167c). When individuals are taken separately, their opinions and views are on a par. There is democracy in holding opinions. But when common good and common interest is taken into account, there are some views more preferable than others, there are erroneous opinions if they are in conflict with the views that may assure the preservation of the city. Therefore, religious underpinnings of the laws and morals of the city are considered to be true according to how much they assure the stability of the city. Religion is thus relative, but not totally arbitrary. There is an element of objectivity in justifying the validity of religious views, or any views, for that matter. Utilitarianism on the social level must involve some objectivity because seldom, if ever, can views dominant in a society be maintained, at least, in the long run, on the whim of an individual – be it a charismatic leader or tyrannical dictator. Historical situation, sociological conditions, political situation, environmental setting, and other factors, most of the time, are beyond the control of single individuals, and

20 It is not necessarily true that "if Protagoras worshipped the gods of the city only for show, his pupils would probably not take the oath seriously", as maintained by DETZ, o.c. (n. 17), p. 141; it is possible that Protagoras does that for show and yet the pupils are making the oath in all trust and seriousness.

21 PLATO, Theaet., 152a = B1.
these conditions determine what ideology will be dominant in the city. In this way, "man" from the homo mensura statement can be understood as referring to humanity or society as a whole.\textsuperscript{22} This, to be sure, is not the kind of ontological objectivity of theology as espoused by philosophical predecessors of Protagoras and by popular religion.

The theological problems are rejected outright from any discussion by Protagoras (Prot., 162e). As mentioned, it may be a token of humble admission of the limitation of human cognitive abilities. However, in view of the fact that Protagoras is a teacher, and a paid teacher at that, it is rather curious that he does not want to discuss and teach problems that are so very important for many, and probably most if not all, citizens. He was not disinterested in ontological problems when he discussed the problem of the unity of being,\textsuperscript{23} but his view on theology seems to indicate that ontology was treated in the positivistic spirit as something to be left aside, and the thrust of his intellectual activity was devoted to the problems of politics, ethics, and pedagogy, in which theology was treated purely instrumentally. Because we cannot reach the essence of the divine, religious issues should be resolved in the homo mensura fashion with the group interest as a primary objective in mind. If a city judges that veneration of Athena is a cohesive social element, Athena should be revered. If Dionysian revelries are such an element, citizens should give themselves to the excesses of the cult because, presumably, this is in the best interest of the city. If familial bonds are strengthened by having wives accompany their dead husbands on their afterlife voyage (as in the Indian rite of sati), this should be done. It would thus be difficult to disagree with the somewhat harsh statement that "Protagoras' man-measure principle, then, commits him to the view that any action can be just if a person or community thinks so, even if it involves blatant disregard for the rights of others".\textsuperscript{24}

Some researchers found an inconsistency between the Protagoras' view that moral requirements are grounded in natural necessity and the Theaetetus' view that all moral requirements are grounded in community will.\textsuperscript{25} The observation is certainly justified. However, the difference between Protagoras' views found in the two dialogs of Plato are not unbridgeable. The necessary development, as delineated in a mythical and nonmythical form in the Protagoras, can be considered the historiographic background of historical development in a particular time and place, and in a particular society. Moral rules are rooted in societal will, but will is grounded in the necessary development that manifests itself in a particular form in a particular historical situation. Community will is not arbitrary because it depends on underlying historical processes. Therefore, if only indirectly, morality is grounded in historical

\textsuperscript{22} It is essential that the homo mensura statement include "a sociological concept of cognition and its value", says E. DUPRÉEül, Les sophistes, Neuchâtel, 1948, p. 19, 25.
\textsuperscript{24} M. NILL, Morality and self-interest in Protagoras, Antiphon and Democritus, Leiden, 1985, p. 31.
necessity after all. Not everyone is able to perceive these processes. This takes a wise man, like Protagoras, to accomplish. A wise man is able to sense what is best applicable in a particular situation. A wise man announces that he is pointing not to what is true and truer, but what is good and better (167ab). He is unwilling to admit that in order for his choice to be preferable over someone else’s choice, the choice must be grounded on a nonsubjective principle, on truth.26 A doctor, to use Protagoras’ example, knows what is better for a sick man, but, unlike Socrates (171e), Protagoras is unwilling to say that a doctor’s decision is based on solid experience that is hardly guided only by subjective decisions of the doctor. There must be an element of truth in what the doctor does in order for his decisions and actions to be better than what a nonspecialist can do. Either way, whether morality is rooted in historical necessity or in the will of the city, Protagoras knows better than others what morality and law should be for individuals and for societies. He positions himself as having a deeper insight than others into things social and political, thus being better as a leader or at least a leader’s advisor. This has an unfortunate effect in that political expediency takes precedence over truth, and in real action what is better or more advantageous suppresses what is true. An instrumental treatment of theology only strengthens this impression. “Religion was understood by Protagoras as a social practice that furthers the goal of civilizing people”.27 Religion becomes a tool in the hands of the ruler, and the Sophist makes certain that citizens agree with that and considers it to be better than anything they themselves could propose on their own.

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26 And the reverse is also true: by not calling superior values truths, Protagoras did not see that “all ‘truths’ are ‘values’ and therefore ‘goods’”, as remarked by F.C.S. SCHILLER, Plato or Protagoras?, Oxford, 1908, p. 18.