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# Structural Causes of the Iranian Revolution

by Ervand Abrahamian

The fall of the Shah will go down in history as perhaps the most dramatic revolution of modern times. In most other revolutions external forces—especially invading armies—have helped shatter the old regime. In the Iranian case, it was internal forces, unaided by outside armies, let alone invading forces, that pulled down the foundations of the old order. In most other revolutions, the opposition has eventually resorted to armed struggle. In the Iranian case, it was mostly peaceful methods, particularly street demonstrations and general strikes, that destroyed the 400,000 man army—the world's fifth largest military force, equipped with the most ultra-modern weapons petrodollars could buy. The only occasion the opposition in Iran used extensive force was in the last three days of the monarchy when the guerrilla organizations delivered their *coup de grace* to the elite Imperial Guards.

In most other revolutions, the collapse of the old order has enough support to mount a counteroffensive and thereby initiate a civil war. But in the Iranian case, the Shah was so weak, so unpopular, and so discredited that he had no choice but to flee without even attempting such a counteroffensive. If there is a civil war in Iran in the near future, it is more likely to be between rival wings of the revolutionary movement than between royalists and revolutionaries.

In most revolutions, the collapse of the old order has paved the way for the triumph of new classes armed with modern organizations, particularly political parties, and inspired by such secular ideologies as nationalism, socialism, and communism. In the Iranian case, however, the revolution has brought to the fore the traditional clergy

armed with the mosque and inspired by a seventh century political philosophy which argues that the religious leaders have the divine right to protect the community from foreigners, guide the country towards righteousness, exercise power over the elected representatives, and scrutinize the activities of all social groups.

The aim of this article is to analyze the structural causes of the revolution, focusing on the socioeconomic pressures that gradually undermined the political establishment and thereby paved the way for the crash of February 1979.\* The contention here is that the failure of the Pahlavi regime to make political modifications appropriate to the changes taking place in the economy and society inevitably strained the links between the social structure and the political structure, blocked the channeling of social grievances into the political system, widened the gap between new social forces and the ruling circles, and, most serious of all, cut down the few bridges that had in the past connected traditional social forces, especially the bazaars, with the political establishment.

## Socioeconomic Development

In the quarter century after the 1953 *coup d'état*, Iran experienced considerable socioeconomic development. This was made possible largely by increasing oil revenues. In 1953, the oil revenues totaled less than \$34 million. By

\* For the short-term causes of the revolution, see *MERIP Reports* #69 (July-August 1978) and #71 (October 1978).

1973, they reached near \$5 billion. And by 1977, after the quadrupling of world oil prices, they topped \$20 billion.<sup>1</sup> Between 1953 and 1978, the cumulative oil income came to as much as \$54 billion. Of course, some of this was wasted on princely palaces, royal grand tours, major festivals, solid gold bathtubs, nuclear projects, and ultra-sophisticated weapons too expensive even for many NATO countries. But despite the wastage, nearly \$30 billion was spent on economic and social projects in the course of the Second (1955-62), Third (1962-68), Fourth (1968-73), and Fifth (1973-78) Development Plans.

As a result of these plans and the rising oil revenues, the gross national product rose at current prices from \$3 billion to over \$53 billion; the value of nonmilitary imports increased from \$40 million to nearly \$12 billion; and the per capita income jumped from less than \$160 to over \$1600 even though the population grew from 18 million to nearly 35 million.

The socioeconomic implications of this growth can be seen best in the realms of education and industrialization. As Table I indicates, over the quarter century from 1953 to 1977, the educational system grew more than tenfold. The growth of modern industry, summarized in Tables II and III, was equally impressive during these 25 years.

This expansion in industry and education, together with growth in the state bureaucracy, increased the ranks of the two modern classes—the salaried middle class and the urban proletariat. In 1953, the modern middle class, counting all salaried employees, civil servants, professionals, engineers, managers, teachers, and other members of the intelligentsia, had numbered no more than 324,000, a mere 5.4 percent of the country's labor force of 5.8 million. By 1977, however, the modern middle class totaled over 630,000, and formed as much as 6.7 percent of the labor force of 9.4 million. This total included 6726 professors, 20,300 engineers, 21,500 medical personnel, 208,241 teach-

ers, and 304,404 civil servants. In addition, there was a large army of students who intended to join the salaried middle class: 154,315 enrolled in higher education, over 90,000 in foreign universities, and 741,000 in secondary schools.

The urban working class grew at a more rapid pace. In 1953, the wage earners employed in modern industry, oil, transport, mining, urban construction, and services located in major population centers totaled no more than 300,000—only 5 percent of the country's labor force. But by 1977, the same sectors employed over 1.7 million, 16 percent of the country's labor force. This included over 800,000 in modern factories, 30,000 in the oil industry, 50,000 in mining, 150,000 railwaymen, dockers, truck drivers and other modern transport workers, 152,000 in services, and well over 500,000 in urban construction. In addition to this modern proletariat, there were some 700,000 agricultural laborers and over 500,000 wage earners employed in rural construction, handicraft manufacturing, and small bazaar workshops. Throughout the country the wage earners totaled 2.9 million and formed more than 25 percent of the labor force.

Although the regime financed the impressive economic growth, it failed, for two major reasons, to win much support from either the salaried middle class or the urban working class. First, the 1953 *coup* not only overthrew the popular leader Dr. Mossadeq, but also destroyed labor unions, professional associations, and all independent political parties, and dug a wide, even unbridgeable, gulf between the regime and the two modern classes. Second, the regime further widened this gulf by implementing policies benefiting the upper class rather than the middle and lower classes, who had no pressure groups through which they could alter or peacefully oppose government decisions.

It was true, as supporters of the regime often argued,

**Table I: EDUCATIONAL GROWTH (Institutions and students)**

Levels	1953	1977
Universities (students)	4 (14,500)	16 (154,315)
Technical training schools (students)	36 (2538)	800 (227,507)
Secondary schools (students)	527 (121,772)	1714 (741,000)
Primary schools (students)	5956 (746,473)	23,476 (4,078,000)*

\* There were an additional 691,000 students in village schools administered by the Literacy Corps.

**Table II: INDUSTRY (Number of Factories)**

	1953	1977
Small (10-49 workers)	less than 1,000	More than 7,000
Medium (50-500 workers)	300	830
Large (over 500 workers)	19	159

**Table III: INDUSTRY (Production)**

	1953	1977
Coal (in tons)	200,000	900,000
Iron ore (in tons)	5,000	930,000
Steel and aluminum (in tons)	.....	275,000
Cement (in tons)	53,000	4,300,000
Sugar (in tons)	70,000	527,000
Electricity (in billion kilowatt hours)	.2	14
Cotton and synthetic textiles (in million meters)	110	533
Tractors	.....	7,700
Motor vehicles (including buses and trucks)	.....	109,000

that during the quarter century, particularly after the White Revolution of 1963, great strides were made in the areas of health, education, and public welfare: the number of doctors increased from 4500 to 13,000, the literacy rate rose from 26 percent to 42 percent, and the infant mortality rate dropped from 20 percent to less than 12 percent. But it was equally true that after 14 years of the so-called White Revolution 68 percent of adults remained illiterate, the number of illiterates actually rose from 13 million to 15 million, less than 40 percent of children completed primary school, only 60,000 university places were available for as many as 290,000 applicants, the percentage of population with higher degrees was one of the lowest in the Middle East, and the doctor-patient ratio remained one of the worst in the whole of Western Asia.

It was true that for many families the standard-of-living improved as they gained access to modern apartments and consumer goods, especially refrigerators, televisions, motorcycles, air conditioners, and private cars. But it was also true that for many urban families the quality-of-life deteriorated as the shanty towns proliferated, the air became more polluted, and the streets turned into traffic nightmares. Between 1967 and 1977, the percentage of urban families living in only one room increased from 36 to 43. On the eve of the revolution, as much as 42 percent of Tehran had inadequate housing. And, despite the vast oil revenues, Tehran, a city of over 4 million, still had no proper sewage system and no proper public transportation system. In a statement reminiscent of Marie Antoinette, the Shah's younger brother, who owned a helicopter assembly plant, asked: "If people don't like traffic jams, why don't they buy helicopters?"<sup>2</sup>

It was true that the White Revolution financed the formation of farm cooperatives, drastically increased the use of tractors, harvesters and fertilizers, and, most important of all, transferred land to 1,638,000 peasant families. It was equally true, however, that 96 percent of the villagers were left without electricity, farm cooperatives were starved of credit, and agricultural production stagnated mainly because of price controls on basic commodities. For every two families that received land one received nothing, and for every one that obtained adequate land (7 hectares) three obtained less than enough to become independent commercial farmers. Thus, despite the White Revolution, land ownership remained highly unequal, as Table IV indicates.

**Table IV: LAND OWNERSHIP**

**AFTER THE WHITE REVOLUTION**

Size	Number of Owners
200 plus hectares	1,300 (including many old aristocracy)
51-200 hectares	44,000 (almost all absentee)
11-50 hectares	600,000 (many absentees)
3-10 hectares	1,200,000
less than 3 hectares	1,000,000
landless	700,000

Income inequality in the cities was equally bad mainly because of the regime's strategy of developing the economy by helping private entrepreneurs. In the absence of statistics on income distribution, we must draw our

conclusions from a number of surveys on urban family expenditures carried out by the Central Bank. These show that in 1959-60 the richest 10 percent of urban households accounted for 35.5 percent of the total expenditures and the richest 20 percent for 51.7 percent. At the other end of the social pyramid, the poorest 10 percent accounted for 1.7 percent of the total expenditures and the poorest 20 percent for 4.7 percent. The middle 40 percent accounted for 27.5 percent. According to an unpublished report of the International Labor Office, this made Iran one of the most inegalitarian societies in the world.<sup>3</sup> This inequality grew even worse during the 1960s. By 1973-74, the top 20 percent of urban families accounted for as much as 55.5 percent of the total expenditures, the bottom 20 percent for as little as 3.7 percent, and the middle 40 percent for no more than 26 percent.

**Table V: DECILE DISTRIBUTION OF URBAN HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURES**

(Percent)

Deciles	1959-1960	1973-1974
(lowest to highest)		
(lowest to highest)	1.7	1.3
1st	2.9	2.4
2nd	4.0	3.4
3rd	5.0	4.7
4th	6.1	5.0
5th	7.3	6.8
6th	8.9	9.3
7th	11.8	11.1
8th	16.4	17.5
9th	35.3	37.9
10th		

\* A hectare is equivalent to 2.471 acres.

The public, while certainly not aware of these statistics, was constantly reminded of the gross inequalities by the rich who flaunted their wealth through conspicuous consumption and by the financial scandals which periodically shook the establishment. In 1974-75 alone, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy was found guilty of pocketing \$3.7 million, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force (the Shah's brother-in-law) was implicated in a \$5 million kick-back scheme. *The Armed Forces Journal International* carried the following indictment:

By 1977 the sheer scale of corruption had reached a boiling point. The Pahlavi Foundation had become a blatant method of grabbing wealth for the royal family. Senior officers obtained vast wealth from commissions. Senior officials who ran companies such as Iran Air and the National Oil Company hardly bothered to conceal their extortions. . . . Even conservative estimates indicate that such corruption involved at least a billion dollars between 1973 and 1976.<sup>4</sup>

Thus the structural tensions were aggravated not by modernization *per se*, but by the way the modernization was implemented and by the fact that the capitalist method of modernization invariably benefits the rich more than the rest of society.



**Iran under the great leadership of the Shah is an island of stability in one of the most troubled areas in the world. This is a great tribute to you, Your Majesty, and to your leadership, and to the respect, admiration and love which your people give to you.**

President Carter in his 1978 New Year's toast to the Shah.

## Political Underdevelopment

While the Shah helped modernize the social structure, he did little to develop the political superstructure—to permit the formation of pressure groups, to open the political arena for social forces, to forge links between the regime and the new classes, and to broaden the base of a monarchy which, after all, had survived only because of the 1953 CIA-military *coup d'état*. On the contrary, he moved in the reverse direction, narrowed the regime's political base, and, most serious of all, broke the ties that in the past had linked, even though tenuously, the monarchy with the traditional middle class.

The traditional middle class remained important for a number of reasons.<sup>5</sup> First, the bazaars, the stronghold of this class, numbered as many as 250,000 shopkeepers and controlled as much as two-thirds of the country's retail trade. The Tehran bazaar alone covered some three square miles and housed over 10,000 stores and workshops. Second, the bazaars, unlike the modern classes, had been able to retain their organizations, especially their craft and trade guilds. Third, the bazaar entrepreneurs exercised considerable influence not only over their store assistants and workshop employees, but also over thousands of peddlers, small retailers, and petty brokers.

Fourth, the influence of the bazaar also reached into the countryside partly because many of the commercial farms were owned by absentee entrepreneurs, and partly because some of the 430,000 small manufacturing plants located in the villages were subsidized by urban businessmen. Employing less than 10 workers, most of whom were women, these small plants specialized in carpet weaving, shoe making, and furniture manufacturing. Finally, the bazaars had social, financial, political, ideological, and

historical links with the religious establishment. This establishment retained a great deal of political influence in part because it had ideological hegemony over the shanty town poor, in part because it controlled the only nationwide organization that had remained independent of the state, and in part because it could mobilize over 90,000 clergymen—some 50 ayatollahs, 5000 hojat al-Islams, 11,000 theology students, and an unknown number of low-ranking preachers, teachers, prayer leaders, and religious procession organizers.

In the period between 1953 and 1975, the regime's policy towards the bazaars was one of "let sleeping dogs lie." It watched carefully, but took care not to arouse bazaar opposition. It spied on the trade and craft guilds, but made no attempt to destroy or replace them as it had done with the factory unions and the professional associations. It favored large entrepreneurs at the expense of small shopkeepers, but did not try to eradicate the bazaar economy. It financed clerics who supported the government, such as Ayatollah Behbehani, and exiled those who openly criticized, notably Ayatollah Khomeini. But at the same time it ignored silent opposition and took precautions not to alienate the entire religious establishment.

This policy failed only twice: first, in 1954 when the bazaars organized a two-day general strike to protest the signing of a new oil agreement with the West; second, in June 1963, when Khomeini, in his first political appearance, denounced the regime for rigging parliamentary elections, allying with Israel against the Arab world, and granting "capitulations" to American military advisers. Taking up the call, thousands of shopkeepers, peddlers, and students poured into the streets to confront the army. According to conservative estimates, some 1000 demonstrators were killed.<sup>6</sup> Despite the bloodshed, martial law lasted no more than a week and the bazaar soon returned

to normal.

In 1975, however, the Shah abandoned the successful policy of “let sleeping dogs lie.” The change was necessitated by the Shah’s decision to form the Resurgence Party (*Hizb-i Rastakhiz*), and thereby transform his military monarchy into a fascist-style totalitarian regime.\* Citizens were given the grand choice of joining the party or “leaving the country.”<sup>7</sup> The aim of the party was twofold: to tighten control over the intelligentsia and the urban working class; and, for the first time in Iranian history, to extend state power into the bazaars and the religious establishment. The Resurgence Party rushed where previous royalist parties had feared to tread.

Within a few months of its formation, the Resurgence Party opened branches in the bazaars, dissolved the traditional guilds, and created new ones under the direct supervision of state bureaucrats. It also set up Chamber of Guilds in the large towns, and gave the presidency of many of these chambers to wealthy businessmen from outside the bazaar. The petty bourgeoisie considered these outsiders to be members of the “comprador oil bourgeoisie.”

Moreover, the party talked of uprooting the bazaars, eradicating their “worm-ridden shops,” bulldozing some of their districts to make way for major roads, and building a state-run market modeled after London’s Covent Gardens. Furthermore, it spoke of the need to raise the minimum wage for bazaar workers, to force shopkeepers and workshop owners to take out medical insurance for their employees, and to extend even more credits to the prosperous entrepreneurs who had opened up large restaurants, supermarkets, and department stores. By 1976, big businessmen could go to state-subsidized banks and borrow at 6 percent interest. Small businessmen, however, had no choice but to go to private moneylenders and borrow at 20-30 percent interest. It is not surprising that during the revolution these banks became a major target for demonstrators.

The regime’s attack on the bazaars was further intensified during the spiraling inflation of 1975-77. Unable to control the inflation, the regime used the small shopkeeper as the major scapegoat and declared war on the bazaars. The mass media hammered away on the theme that “bazaar profiteers” were sucking dry the blood of consumers. The Resurgence Party scrutinized store accounts with some 10,000 so-called inspectors. Meanwhile, the Guild Courts, set up to punish “profiteers,” jailed some 8000 businessmen, shopkeepers and peddlers, exiled from their home towns another 23,000, and fined as many as 200,000 more.<sup>8</sup>

One shopkeeper complained to the correspondent of *Le Monde* that the White Revolution had turned into a Red Revolution and that “party thugs” had official sanction to terrorize the bazaars.<sup>9</sup> Similarly, another shopkeeper told the correspondent of the *New York Times*: “If we let him, the Shah will destroy us. The banks are taking over. The big stores are undermining our livelihoods. And the government will flatten our bazaars to make room for state offices.”<sup>10</sup>

\* The idea of creating the Resurgence Party was pushed by a group of young Ph.D.s from America who were well versed in the works of Samuel Huntington, especially in his theory that the only way to obtain political stability in developing societies is to create a disciplined government party which in turn would mobilize the public. Subsequent events showed that such a party, if lacking social support, would produce exactly what it was supposed to avoid—a political revolution. —E.A.

The regime waged a simultaneous war against the religious establishment. The Resurgence Party declared the Shah to be not only the “political leader” of the state but also the “spiritual guide” of the community.<sup>11</sup> The Shah himself announced the coming of a “new great civilization.” To hasten its arrival, he replaced the Muslim calendar with a new royalist calendar and thereby jumped overnight from the year 1355 to 2535. Parliament, disregarding the *shar‘ia* laws, raised the age of marriage for girls from 15 to 18 and for boys from 18 to 20. The Justice Minister instructed judges to be more strict in their enforcement of the 1967 Family Protection Law, which had been designed to restrict both polygomy and men’s right to obtain easy divorces. The Education Minister ordered universities not to register women who insisted on wearing the *chador* (long veil). Moreover, the newly established Religious Corps, modeled on the Literacy Corps, intensified its activities so as to teach peasants that “true Islam” differed from that preached by “black reactionary *mullahs*.” In the words of an exiled newspaper affiliated with the clerical opposition, the aim of this corps was to “nationalize religion” and undermine the “spiritual leaders.”<sup>12</sup>

When the religious leaders protested these actions, the regime cracked down. Fazieh, the main seminary in Qum, was closed down. Ayatollah Shamsabadi, a prominent preacher in Isfahan, was murdered a few days after he had spoken out against the new calendar. Shaikh Hussein Ghoffari, a 60-year-old ayatollah, was detained on suspicion of aiding guerrillas and was tortured to death. Moreover, a group of prominent clerics were arrested for denouncing the Resurgence Party as “un-Islamic” and “unconstitutional.” The group included not only former prison inmates, such as Ayatollahs Taleqani and Zanjani, but also many newcomers, such as Ayatollah Beheshti, Ayatollah Montazeri, Ayatollah Hassain Qumi, Hojat al-Islam Kani, and Hojat al-Islam Lahuti. Never before had so many prominent clerics found themselves in the same prison.

The clerical opposition was further reinforced by another problem—the “moral problem” created by unplanned urbanization. The dramatic influx of oil revenues led to a major construction boom. This, together with the agricultural stagnation, drew millions of unemployed villagers into the cities. The number of migrants, which had totaled 3 million between 1956 and 1971, jumped to over 380,000 annually after 1971. Since many of the migrants were young, unmarried and unskilled, and since the cities lacked housing and social services, the new shanty towns produced predictable problems: crime, alcoholism, prostitution, delinquency, and rising suicide rates. Shocked by these problems, the *mullas* reacted much in the same way as many clergy would react in other parts of the world. They argued that moral laxity had endangered society and that the only remedy was to enforce traditional values and religious laws. In nineteenth century England, haphazard urbanization produced the Methodist movement. In contemporary Iran, the same problem helped to create the Khomeini phenomenon.

In a revealing speech made after the revolution, Ahmad Khomeini, the influential son of Ayatollah Khomeini, divided his fellow clergy into three groups.<sup>13</sup> The first, he argued, had supported the Shah to the very end because it has received generous subsidies from the state. In his esti-

mate, this group formed only a tiny minority. The second group, by contrast, had staunchly opposed the Shah because it had fundamental criticisms of his economic, social, political, and even international policies. In his estimate, this group also constituted a small minority. The third group, however, which formed the vast majority, had remained silent until 1976-77 because it had neither liked the Shah nor disliked him enough to speak out. According to Ahmad Khomeini, what had led these clerics to break their silence was not the realization that the Shah was destroying the country and selling Iran to Western imperialism, but rather the shock of seeing "moral decadence" flaunted in the streets and the double shock of finding that the authorities were unwilling, if not incapable, of cleaning up the "social filth." Having no channels through which they could communicate the grievances to the political system, they reluctantly joined the anti-regime clergy to mount the final assault on the Shah.

## Conclusion

For any state to survive an economic crisis—and all states sooner or later have to confront such a crisis—it needs to have a social base and enjoy the support of a significantly large class. The Shah, despite the vast oil revenues, failed to obtain the necessary social base. He failed to win over the intelligentsia and the proletariat, and moreover, implemented socioeconomic policies that drastically expanded their ranks without altering their previous opposition. Since there were no avenues for either channeling demands into the political superstructure or reforming the social structure, more and more members of these two modern classes found themselves completely alienated from the regime. Some emigrated or joined underground parties and guerrilla groups. The vast majority, however, internalized their anger and patiently awaited the day when they could express their years of frustration.

As if the opposition of the intelligentsia and the proletariat was not enough, the Shah in 1975 embarked on a course that brought him to a head-on collision with the bazaars and the powerful religious establishment. Thus when an acute economic crisis hit the country in 1975-77, the regime found itself first isolated, then besieged from all sides, and eventually submerged in a flood of hatred directed not only at the monarchy and its military establishment, but also at the ruling class and their foreign patrons.

The Shah himself, in December 1978, summed up the tragicomedy of his sinking regime. When asked by a foreign correspondent where his supporters were, he shrugged his shoulders and replied, "Search me."<sup>14</sup>

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup>The statistics used in this paper have been obtained from the following sources: F. Fesharaki, *Development of the Iranian Oil Industry*, New York, 1976; Plan and Budget Organization, *Salnameh-i Amar-i Keshvar (Annual Statistics for the Country)*, Tehran, 1977; Interior Ministry, *Amar-i Omumi (National Census)*, Tehran, 1957, II; Al Ashraf (ed.), *Shakhsa-yi Ijtima'i Iran (Social Indicators of Iran)*, Tehran, 1976; M. Shin, "A Look at Educational Facilities in Contemporary Iran," *Nameh-i Parsi*, VI, 4 (December 1957), pp. 1-50; G. Lenczowski (ed.), *Iran Under The Pahlavis*, Stanford, 1978; Industrial and Mining Development Bank of Iran, *Fifteenth Annual Report*, Tehran, 1975.

<sup>2</sup>Quoted by M. Tehranian, "Iran: Communication, Alienation, Revolution," *Intermedia*, VII, 2 March 1979), pp. 6-12.

<sup>3</sup>International Labor Office, "Employment and Income Policies for Iran: Appendix C," (Unpublished report, Geneva, 1972).

<sup>4</sup>A. Mansur (pseud.), "The Crisis in Iran," *Armed Forces Journal International* (January 1979), pp. 26-33.

<sup>5</sup>For the role of the bazaars in contemporary Iran, see M. 'Atiqpour, *Naqsh-i Bazaar va Bazaariha dar Inqilab-i Iran (The Role of the Bazaar and Bazaaris in the Iranian Revolution)* Tehran, 1979.

<sup>6</sup>*Washington Post*, November 15, 1978.

<sup>7</sup>The Shah, "Speech to the Nation," *Keyhan International*, March 8, 1975.

<sup>8</sup>J. Kendell, "The Tehran Bazaar," *New York Times*, June 29, 1979.

<sup>9</sup>E. Rouleau, "Iran: Myth and Reality," *The Guardian*, October 31, 1976.

<sup>10</sup>J. Kendell, "Iran's Students and Merchants Form an Unlikely Alliance," *New York Times*, November 7, 1979.

<sup>11</sup>Anonymous, "Reflections on the Revolution," *Keyhan International*, November 17, 1976.

<sup>12</sup>Anonymous, "Nationalization of Religion," *Mujahed*, III, 29 (March 1975), pp. 6-10.

<sup>13</sup>A. Khomeini, "Don't Treat the Clergy As If It Were One Group," *Ittila'at*, September 23, 1979.

<sup>14</sup>N. Gage, "Iran: Making of a Revolution," *New York Times*, December 17, 1978.



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