The Future of the Algerian Revolution

Author(s): Houari Boumediene


Published by: Cambridge University Press

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/159313
E.A.M.A. will have practical proposals to put before the E.E.C. They are already endeavouring to examine possible solutions systematically and to choose those which seem appropriate to each specific case.

Another example of our co-operative efforts is provided by the first congress of medical sciences organised in Tananarive last April, on a subject so far unexplored, 'Health and Development'. A seminar will be held shortly on popular participation in development and a committee of experts will be set up to study the O.C.A.M. press agency. We have the same broad perspective in our efforts to develop regional research programmes and to establish institutions for the training and education of regional officials.

Clear-cut tasks await the Organisation; on their successful outcome depends the future of O.C.A.M., which, in the words of President Houphouët-Boigny, 'will play an indispensable part within the Organisation of African Unity as a nucleus and a unifying force'.

ALBERT EKUE
Département des affaires culturelles et sociales, O.C.A.M., Yaoundé

The Future of the Algerian Revolution

Political speeches by African leaders are seldom fully reported outside the country concerned; and it is especially difficult for English-speaking research workers to track down the ephemeral political documents of Francophone Africa. It therefore seems appropriate to publish the following extracts from an important speech delivered by President Boumediène to senior officials—

les cadres de la nation—meeting at the Palais des Nations, Algiers, on 19 June 1968. A French translation was published in the local newspaper El-Moudjahid (Algiers), 21 June 1968, and in two parts in successive weekly issues of Révolution africaine: organe centrale du F.L.N. (Algiers), 279–80, June–July 1968. We have translated into English the newspaper version, which includes a few paragraphs omitted, perhaps in error, from the weekly; our text has been abbreviated by the omission, where indicated, of certain repetitive passages and some rhetorical appeals, which were clearly intended for a live audience rather than the printed page, in order to let the gist of the speech stand out more clearly.

The context of the speech was the third anniversary of the coup which overthrew Ben Bella; it therefore sets forth the achievements and prospects of the régime from the point of view of its leaders. Perhaps it should be read in conjunction with one of the published accounts of the background and aims of the 1965 rising. Two recent, somewhat critical assessments of current developments in Algeria may be mentioned here: Arslan Humbaraci, Algeria: a revolution that failed—a political history since 1954 (London, 1966); and William H. Lewis, ‘Algeria Against Itself’, in Africa Report (Washington), xii, 9, December 1967.

* * *
Address by President Houari Boumediène of Algeria on the Third Anniversary of the Rising of 19 June 1965

...Dear brothers, officials of the nation, it is useful today to examine the progress and achievements accomplished during the last three years and to review the various aspects of the Revolution during this period...

Certain ill-disposed persons have tried to spread doubt and confusion by means of a hostile propaganda campaign intended to convince public opinion in the country and throughout the world that on 19 June [1965] we took a step backward and not a leap forward. People acting out of self-interest, others motivated by private material interests who regarded all revolutionary progress as a threat to their privileges, as well as agents in the pay of foreign countries, have deliberately tried to create and maintain this atmosphere of doubt and confusion...

The 19 June movement was a reaction against the anarchy and chaos which prevailed in every sphere of activity. Its purpose was to deliver the Revolution from the anomalous situation in which one person could turn it to his own advantage and claim to be the exclusive representative of the Revolution, of socialism, of the people, and of the Algerian nation...

Administrative Reforms

The situation in the country before 19 June was catastrophic economically, financially, and in the organisation of the state machinery. No Algerian, whether rich or poor, whether working in a national enterprise or in any other sphere of activity, had...any stability or security as regards the future. What is more, persons foreign to our country and to our Revolution had succeeded in permeating the run-down machinery of government and had tried to prevent the Revolution from accomplishing its aims.

After the 19 June movement, one of our primary duties and principal concerns was to organise the machinery of government, to study the national economy and to free it from dependence on foreign countries. We also had to reorganise the party on a new basis, in accordance with the new situation and the aims of the socialist Revolution. The general purpose of our movement was to establish a modern democratic State on firm foundations, since this is indispensable for the construction and development of any country...

Foreigners and Trotskyists infiltrated into the party and state machinery immediately after independence. They did not believe in the future of Algeria and were not at all interested in its Revolution. Their main concern, was to create confusion and to make use of demagoguery, verbal revolution, revolution in the salons and in pamphlets, in their endeavour to take over the genuine Algerian Revolution. These foreign, Trotskyist and other elements aimed at the collapse and dissolution of the state at a time when the state had not yet been established and was lying in ruins after being destroyed by the enemy. The state, according to propagandists of this school, is simply a means of exploitation. However, modern history has shown that it is impossible for any society to make headway without a state. This is obvious. There is no better proof of this fact than the situation in socialist
countries, where the structure of the state is more solid than in capitalist countries...

Our policy...is primarily to resurrect Algeria and to establish a modern state respected at home and abroad. Thanks to our efforts, several objectives have been achieved, the most important being the strengthening of authority. We have bridged the gap and put an end to the period of regionalism and pressure groups. Now that this unhealthy situation has been liquidated, a modern state of Algeria is being built, and its laws are daily being established. Algerian officials are now restored to their proper positions, after a period of doubt, instability, and lack of confidence within the country, which was exploited by foreign powers and dominated by specific groups...Today there is order and stability in the country, thanks to effective authority and to an efficient state, which guarantees security and respect for property and persons, which has eliminated anarchy, and which tirelessly pursues its efforts to cleanse every sector and every branch of government.

In spite of these results, there is still a long way to go before the state is established. The machinery we have set up is still new, our officials themselves are still young and lacking in experience and integrity.

We must accept self-criticism frankly and objectively, and recognise the lack of integrity, particularly among high-ranking officials, except for a very small minority. These officials do not fully shoulder their responsibilities in managing their sectors or in their relations with the public. This shortcoming is a danger on which we must concentrate...

Last year we established People’s Communal Assemblies on a democratic basis; their purpose is to serve the working masses—fellahin and workers—and we gave them responsibilities which we are now extending. Establishing a state on a democratic basis implies preparing and carrying out a reorganisation of the départements. For in a country as vast as Algeria, which is living through a revolutionary period of intense activity, it is impossible for the central government to deal with the enormous number of responsibilities that have to be faced.

That is why we have followed a policy of decentralisation, of sharing responsibility, from the bottom to the top of the hierarchy, in order to build the state on democratic foundations. These are the reasons which have led us to set up fact-finding commissions, to undertake local government reforms, to envisage the establishment of new départements in order to create closer contacts between the lower and the higher levels, that is to say between the municipalities and the central government services. Subsequently département councils will be granted more extensive jurisdiction and powers, on the lines of the municipal councils....

The Economy

(i) Autogestion in agriculture. Our national sovereignty will inevitably be incomplete so long as our economy depends on foreign countries...That is why the second aim of our policy has been to concentrate on our economy. First of all we had to put an end to chaos, which was caused partly by the colonialists, the O.A.S., and our economic dependence on the former colonial power, and partly by the anarchy which had developed in all sectors—
agricultural, industrial, financial, and commercial—owing to a policy of improvisation, irresponsibility, demagoguery, and a bid for leadership of the Tiers-Monde...

Farming in Algeria, which had yielded thousands of millions in profits to the settlers during the colonial period, had become an enormous expense for the Treasury. This situation, which arose during the period of chaos and demagoguery, created a deficit of more than 100,000 million [old] francs while the government of the time stated that everything was fine and that autogestion [workers' control] was going well.

Either owing to lack of courage or for political reasons, nobody, not even the person mainly responsible nor those close to him, had asserted the contrary. This was a crime against the people and the national economy, a crime which could lead Algeria into a new form of colonialism; yet nobody had the courage to raise their voice to denounce it, in spite of the critical danger.

We opposed this situation and supported a form of autogestion that does not involve deficits to be borne by the people. We affirmed that autogestion itself was not sacrosanct, but only the people's revolution, which must triumph... However, at the time all activities were directed from Algiers, with a bureaucratic organisation and such a paralysingly centralised system that autogestion was practically non-existent, since workers who earned 700 francs under the colonial system continued to receive the same salary after independence, even under the new system of autogestion. It was in this abnormal context that the rising of 19 June took place.

Some of the ill-disposed individuals who try to destroy revolutions by means of pamphlets launched a propaganda campaign to the effect that the government that came into power after the revolutionary uprising intended to put an end to autogestion. We countered this slanderous propaganda by our clear determination to strengthen autogestion, if the system proved viable.

We then identified all the operational weaknesses of autogestion and exposed all its frauds, for it must be stated that the workers, fellahin, and children of the people were victimised by the lies and demagoguery of those who claimed to have founded, planned, and carried out the system of autogestion.

We asserted this primary truth in spite of the criticisms and opposition of those who did not believe in autogestion and attached no significance to it. There were even cases of 'revolution-mongers' who had settled down in Switzerland and elsewhere and were lamenting the fate of autogestion. It was used as a weapon and an excuse to establish a new political force in the country, which had no connexion with the Revolution of 1 November. This was the actual purpose of such people who at the time had ceaselessly extolled the virtues and successes of autogestion, whereas the system was on the brink of disaster. I have already announced that the deficit in this sector was running into thousands of millions of francs...

The stagnant situation in agriculture caused great anxiety among the people. It meant that the poor fellahin lost all confidence in the state, which, in their eyes, had become a means of extortion. This led to carelessness, laziness, and neglect of the land through fear that the state would deprive
them of the fruits of their labour. What was much more serious was that they began to attribute to socialism features which were contrary to its very purpose... Our primary task was to analyse and study this phenomenon realistically in order to avoid making empty promises when applying the system of autogestion.

That is why we decided, in October 1966, to promote a policy of decentralisation in autogestion, which would give considerable internal autonomy to production units... After three years of sustained effort, supported by a clear-cut, sincere policy... here are figures to prove the success of autogestion: for the first time, workers on 580 farms have been rewarded for their efforts by receiving about 1,000 DA each as their share of the profits. Results are still inadequate, however, since only 580 of the 1,800 worker-controlled farms achieved positive results. But we have great hopes that results will improve in the future.

The result of this new, wise policy was that the small fellahin in the traditional sector regained confidence, first of all in themselves and secondly in the state which provided assistance, mainly in the form of subsidies. They realised that the revolutionary authorities were looking after them and had undertaken to safeguard their interests, whatever the difficulties, in view of the economic, historical, and political factors involved. This was only fair to the fellahin, who had borne the full brunt of the war and the Revolution. That is why the socialist rising of 19 June offered a helping hand to this neglected class of people.

The poor fellahin, who were driven into their mountain dwellings by the settlers, away from the fertile lands, are the constant concern of the socialist Revolution. During the last three years, the Revolution has provided these hard-working, deprived people with more than twice as much financial aid as they received during the whole colonial period. This has encouraged the fellahin to acquire new equipment, and to continue the upkeep and development of the land, for the benefit of the whole countryside. We are sure that the results of these efforts will become evident in the next few years...

(ii) The control of industry. Dear brothers, there were two sectors of industry: what was called the socialist sector included only small firms abandoned by their owners, and the other sector was controlled by foreign capitalist firms. As a result, we undertook to integrate small firms into national enterprises... This policy was criticised on the fallacious grounds that it is contrary to the socialist system, even anti-socialist, to establish sociétés nationales [state-controlled firms], or to bring any sector under state control.

Is anarchy synonymous with socialism? In the Soviet Union and in China, enterprises are state-controlled. The system of autogestion itself is regarded as a deviation by some modern theorists of socialism. For example, Marxists in some socialist countries, especially the Soviet Union, criticised autogestion as a deviationist policy when it was applied in Yugoslavia.

As far as Algeria is concerned, we have decided, in spite of criticism, to establish sociétés nationales, because we have undertaken to put an end to anarchy, speculation, and stagnation in this field. This new form of organisation is a first stage which will be followed by others. The government and the party will continue to serve the higher interests of the fellahin and the workers.
It has been, and still is, our belief that the economy is an indivisible entity, so that we are obliged to deal with the industrial and agricultural sectors at one and the same time.

This economic organisation necessitated the freeing of the industrial sector from control by foreign powers and from capital exploitation as well as the elimination of contradictions... After three years' continuous effort, we have succeeded in reorganising this sector by eliminating anarchy and foreign monopolies. As a result of these measures, the state-controlled industrial sector includes 80 per cent of all industrial enterprise... there are practically no neo-colonialist bases in revolutionary, socialist Algeria...

How can a socialist economy be established when the banks are under foreign control?... Foreign banks have refused to deal with the socialist sector. We have also had to nationalise the insurance companies, just as we had to nationalise the mines when we decided to establish our steel industry. It was inconceivable that we should spend more than 150,000 million [old] francs to build a steel mill at Annaba, while the Onenza company was allowed to supply the plant with ore. Logic, as well as the revolution, required that all mines should be nationalised without exception.

The same applies to companies marketing petroleum products intended chiefly for consumption by Algerians and Algerian industries; it had become impossible to tolerate any longer the incongruous prices charged throughout the country, just as it was impossible for foreign companies to participate in implementing a national policy based on the elimination of the 'zoning' system. How can Algerians who produce fuel be expected to pay much higher prices for it than the French who import it? It was therefore essential to nationalise the companies supplying petroleum and its by-products...

These examples deserve to be mentioned because foreign monopolies pretended to be surprised when we took these decisions... The purpose of our revolutionary decisions is to establish an independent economy, on a sound basis and free from any kind of exploitation. These revolutionary aims have been achieved...

As an example I shall simply refer to the milk shortage during the recent events which took place on the other side of the Mediterranean... we should ensure that our country is self-sufficient as regards milk, cheese, etc. We must therefore encourage animal husbandry... Our country has the necessary resources to achieve development, and has an adequate supply of raw materials... It simply remains for us to develop our resources in order to achieve this purpose. This task has already begun, since we have built factories in various parts of the country. Development is being carried out by means of resources which, although not completely Algerian, are gradually tending to become Algerian thanks to the country's efforts and to the serious nature of our policy.

(iii) Foreign capital. The position with regard to foreign capital can be summarised as follows: we can never co-operate with foreign capital if it is a means of exploitation. Any other policy would mean poverty and destitution.

In this field we have already undertaken an experiment which failed because foreign capital, in spite of the facilities and guarantees granted, was
unable to avoid its two main defects: fear and exploitation. This goes to show that foreign capital cannot be persuaded to co-operate with a socialist system like ours. It can only lead to poverty, as in Latin America or in many other countries of the Tiers-Monde which have relied on foreign capital and have remained bogged down in poverty and under-development. This is why, in the light of this experience, we have based our policy on strict co-operation with foreign capital which agrees to co-operate on our terms, as in our relations with France.

In any case it is impossible to co-operate with foreign capital, since this means giving up our chosen revolutionary policy. This decision is in no way the monopoly of the government or of any particular person, but the prerogative of the people, who have clearly chosen their course. All these considerations have taught us to rely solely on ourselves... Thus foreign capital can play only a complementary role, according to conditions clearly laid down, which will prevent it from exploiting our country economically.

As regards national capital, I am convinced that Algerians with financial resources have a part to play because it is better to invest private savings in productive undertakings than to keep them frozen or to use them to purchase cafes and bars. Algerian capital should play its part and fulfil its duty to the nation; the state is prepared to provide all necessary guarantees within a clearly defined context. It is not in the country’s interest for this capital to remain unproductive.

We should also recall the government’s decisions to eliminate regional inequalities and to establish a balanced economy in the country. During the Ouargia and Batna meetings, measures were taken on behalf of the départements of Saoura and the Aurès. Other measures will be taken in due course for the départements of Grande Kabylie, Titteri, and Saida...

In conclusion, the financial situation, from the economic as well as the political point of view, safeguards us from any foreign pressure. We are no longer subjected to these pressures under cover of loans or capital grants. This is the profound significance of our policy of austerity, which has not however been understood by some people. The aim of this policy was, and still is, to free the country and to safeguard the State against foreign financial domination.

Educational Progress

Efforts have constantly been made, not only in the two above-mentioned sectors, but also in the field of education, which must also be freed from foreign control. Our independence would be incomplete if we continued to depend on foreign assistance, especially in technical matters. We must admit that we have not been freed from foreign control, since there are many foreign experts in several branches of education. This imposes a heavy financial cost; it is also difficult for foreign officials to understand the true situation of the country and to identify themselves with its policy.

The government had to find a solution for this dangerous situation. Education is encouraged and given priority over other national obligations. Many school buildings have been constructed and army barracks have been converted into institutes, in order to free our people from ignorance and thus
to free our economy and to consolidate our independence. An educated nation cannot go hungry.

The purpose of all our endeavours is to train a sufficient number of Algerian officials in all fields. The government has allocated a considerable amount of money in order to develop this vitally important sector, in the interests of the country's future in this century of science and technology...

1968, the Year of the Party

It is unnecessary to emphasise the impossibility of achieving a revolution without the participation and organisation of the masses. The fact that during the last three years we have given priority to the establishment of the machinery of government and economic liberation does not mean that we have neglected the party or that we thought of carrying out the revolution without a revolutionary organisation.

On the contrary, we have already announced that 1968 is the year of the party. I do not want to dwell on this point—I shall merely emphasise the vital necessity of organising the party on a basis corresponding to the requirements of a modern society and in line with the aims of the socialist revolution.

This is the general party line. I should like to point out that there are some people who have been militants but are now tired of this activity. We do not criticise them. We cannot blame them if they want to be reconverted. There are others who were militants during a specific historical period but who, owing to the changes in Algerian society, have been either physically or ideologically unable to follow the forward movement or to continue the fight in its new phase.

We cannot criticise those who have drawn aside from the movement and have chosen a non-militant line in this revolutionary organisation, the party. It is the party’s duty to select those who can continue the struggle in its new phase, to rely principally on committed militants, who are convinced of the correctness of the political line adopted by the revolutionary authorities, and to dismiss uncommitted persons, since the problem of commitment is of vital importance.

We preferred to be flexible during the first year. We must be frank with ourselves and state for the last time that anyone who wants to march side by side with us in the party must be committed. For committal is a pre-requisite for the cohesion of a revolutionary movement, which can only achieve its highest aims if uncommitted elements are resolutely removed...

I take this opportunity of repeating that this year we must achieve our basic aims, which are: commitment, cohesion, and the establishment of authority within the party.

The method of party organisation formerly followed, the weakness in making political decisions, could only have led to the weakening of the party structure. Apart from the problems inherited, which gave rise to so many obstacles and difficulties, the party was quite incapable of playing its role as the driving force behind the Revolution as well as its defender, but had become a vast breeding-ground of rumours, insults, and tendentious criticism of the authorities, which was quite contradictory to its militant role. We
affirm frankly and objectively that we shall have failed in our duties if we do not reject those who are incapable of joining our ranks and raising high the banner of the Revolution.

I have already referred to the necessity of providing training for officials at all levels, in accordance with our commitments to the people and the Revolution. It is however advisable to distinguish between the torch-bearers of the Revolution and those who masquerade as revolutionaries. These are in fact undermining the Revolution, which requires determined, faithful militants to defend it against its many enemies.

1968 is the year of the party, and we are convinced that we shall be victorious because socialist Algeria is famous for the long and difficult struggles endured in the course of its history...I can assure young people that this reorganisation of the party should give great scope to the vital forces of the nation, including the millions of the new, pure generation, which is capable of bearing the flag of the Revolution and achieving great leaps forward.

The revolutionary authorities will make every effort to enable the young members of the liberation front to organise and carry on the struggle within as well as outside the party. We do not close the door to those who wish to become militants. The door has been open to all since 19 June 1965, irrespective of their past. The sole criterion we impose on everyone is that they should prove their competence and their devotion to the interests of the nation.

The door will remain open to all those who accept our policy, and are prepared to assist in applying it. The others can leave the party and choose their own way...Our policy does not deviate from democratic principles, which imply reliance on the rank and file in any organisation. Persons in authority will be chosen by the militants in order gradually to eliminate the selection of officers by top-level authorities, especially in the party.

Foreign Policy

(i) The Maghreb. As we celebrate today the anniversary of the 19 June rising, we have not forgotten that this time last year grave disaster befell the Arab nation. However, before referring to this, I should like to clarify our policy with regard to the Arab Maghreb. Since 19 June 1965, this has been a clearly defined policy of non-interference in internal affairs. We do not interfere in the affairs of neighbouring sister countries, just as we shall refuse to allow any interference in our own affairs or any threat to our national sovereignty or territorial integrity. This is a clear, unequivocal principle.

We have stated on several occasions that the aim of our policy would not be to restore past glories but that on the contrary it would be forward-looking and geared to the modern world. If we were to speak of the past of the Arab Maghreb, which is an integral part of the past of the whole Arab nation, we should realise that it belonged to a decadent period of Arabo-Islamic civilisation and that this decadence was exploited by the colonial system. Any attempt to assess this period in the history of the Maghreb by examining the past involves the danger of being overwhelmed by a mass of contradictions and being prevented from undertaking any constructive work... But we are people open to the future.
Our régime as well as our government is socialist; we are following a specific policy in the organisation and establishment of the economy, in our foreign policy, and in our attitude towards the just causes of emancipation and liberation. We have proclaimed that if a policy of peaceful co-existence has been established between major powers with different social systems, such a form of co-existence is all the more natural between the brothers and the sons who belong to one and the same people. The people of the Arab Maghreb are one and the same, by the realities of their history, their language, and their religion.

We are also interested in practical co-operation in cultural, commercial, and other fields, with an eye to the future. We shall not bring up the differences which exist but shall leave them aside and concentrate on more important matters. If we cannot establish the Arab Maghreb in this age of international groupings, at least we should refrain from obstructing this undertaking by imposing fresh obstacles. I am personally convinced that this policy, established since 19 June, remains unchanged. We reaffirm it today in order to clarify matters. We are in favour of fruitful and unconditional co-operation, and are prepared to study all aspects of it.

As for the political systems adopted by these countries, we have stated frankly that this is a matter to be decided by the peoples of each country. We do not impose the choice of a particular régime on anybody; on the other hand we shall never allow any foreign power to interfere in our affairs and try to influence the fundamental choices of our people. That is our policy with regard to the Arab Maghreb.

(ii) The war against Israel. There is another problem which closely affects Algeria and the Algerians as a whole. That is the problem of the Palestinian people. This problem must be studied as a whole. It is the problem of a people driven out of their own country as a result of a conspiracy against the Arab nation at a time when it was sunk in lethargy and internally divided. This was how a conquering state was established, on a racist and Zionist basis.

Sooner or later a solution must be found to this problem, even if it takes centuries, because this is a just cause, a people driven from its native land by a conquering nation.

The sacred struggle for the liberation of Palestine and the recuperation of stolen lands cannot be dissociated from the anti-colonialist struggle against imperialist zones of influence in the Middle East.

International institutions for Zionist propaganda put out stories of the massacre of the Jews, of their being driven into the sea; in fact the Zionist reality is a military base established by the colonialists and intended to prevent the development of the Arab nation, in order to safeguard imperialist interests.

The method used by Arab leaders during the last 20 years to pose the Palestinian problem has proved to be wrong. We shall continue to become involved in these errors unless we change our methods and pose the problem in a new way. We must work and fight according to a policy in which we have unshakeable confidence. Unfortunately the common attitude of Arab leaders towards this cause has only been superficial and purely formal. In some cases it was merely sentimental reaction.
Before, during, and after the disaster we emphasised the necessity of laying down a general policy for the struggle against Israel and those who created it. We stated that it was impossible to wage war against Israel while co-operating with those who help her and provide finance and arms to restore her power. In view of the setbacks experienced, we stated that all available weapons should be used to avoid losing the war. We also emphasised that this was far more than a local affair, that it concerned all Arabs and that total war should be waged against the Zionist presence in Palestine, against imperialist bases, and especially against the powerful oil companies which control the vital sectors in this part of the world and are consequently more dangerous than the Zionist presence in Palestine.

Was it right to restrict the fighting to a single part of the vast Arab world? Was the struggle taking place on behalf of the Gulf of Akaba, the Suez Canal, or the mountains of Syria? Did the problem simply involve the battle of Jerusalem? Should not the fighting be regarded from a very broad viewpoint?

Events have proved the correctness of our analysis and of our attitude with regard to the need to continue the struggle and to extend the scope of the fighting. It is absolutely impossible to accept defeat after losing one battle. This would transform the lost battle into a final victory for the enemy... Then some people described our attitude as senseless. They claimed that the Algerians, intoxicated with their victory over French colonialism, could not understand the nature of warfare in the Arab East. But time has proved the correctness of our view, and we shall continue to assert it, since it is based on an objective, revolutionary analysis.

This does not in any way mean that we wish our sister countries to be occupied... In view of the extent of the disaster we said that, although the enemy might occupy Damascus, Amman, or Cairo, under no circumstances should we capitulate, since the Arab nation would inevitably win the final victory, and we were actually in a position to achieve it.

Today, one year later, we can say to the defeatists and theorists of despondency that they were mistaken. Even the United States of America is not an invincible power. Every day the whole world learns of defeats it is suffering at the hands of the gallant sons of the Vietnamese people. So what could Israel do, with its small population of two million, against the whole Arab world, when the population of Cairo alone is four million?

Is there anyone among you who does not remember the historic battle which took place in Algiers, this battle for which the French mobilised more than 80,000 elite soldiers to face the inhabitants of the Casbah, Belcourt, and the suburbs of Algiers? However, the battle went on, in spite of the fact that the colonial troops were supported by more than half the population of Algiers, who were Europeans. Yes, the fighting continued, in spite of the enemy’s superiority in men and equipment, and we paid a high price for our freedom.

In view of such examples, who could persuade us today to accept defeat? We have never accepted, and shall never accept defeat. We believe in the need for Arab solidarity, but solidarity in battle and not in defeat. This is the policy in which we believe and which we have proclaimed clearly. We
declared that it was impossible to accept the cease-fire after a defeat, but that the fighting should continue and be extended beyond the battle areas. But to accept the fait accompli of defeat and the occupation is a direct threat to the development, if not the very existence, of the Arab nation...

Today, a year after the June disaster, the situation has hardly changed. Israel still occupies Arab territories, which she is fortifying by establishing settlements. The city of Jerusalem is under Zionist domination. Israel is in a strong position and time is on her side. In principle we are not against peaceful solutions. In fact, in this particular case it is not a question of a solution by peace or war. On the one hand there is a solution with dignity and justice, and on the other with indignity and oppression. And so, one year after the June war, the situation remains the same...

This is an appropriate time to draw the attention of our Palestinian brothers to the national duty they should fulfil. They must remain in their territory and fight, whatever dangers and difficulties this may involve. It is better for those who live in Jerusalem to stay there and die than to flee into the refugee camps. Our Palestinian brothers should therefore reject the policy of convenience which they have followed hitherto. They should not follow the example of the sons of Israel who said to Moses: 'Follow thy God into battle, but we will remain here.'

What happened after the Palestinians had waited 20 years for the Arab armies to fight Israel for them? It was a disaster. It is true that the Arabs have certain obligations towards Palestine, but the Palestinians must fulfil their national duty to free their country, by abandoning any idea of emigrating... We consider that it is the duty of the Arabs to use all their available resources to win this battle. They must use these resources in the framework of a realist, active policy to recover their dignity. But they must be aware of the price to be paid for it.

(iii) Franco-Algerian relations. After the Palestinian affair I should like to refer to another problem which is also of immediate concern for Algeria—that of her relationship with France. I shall refer to this subject today partly because of recent comments on the development of co-operation between Algeria and France, and partly because of misunderstandings arising from certain unilateral decisions and measures taken by the other party. Some self-examination was therefore necessary concerning the co-operation between our two countries.

It should be emphasised that a wise Algerian policy in this field has been able to overcome the hazards and hatreds arising from the past, the 130 years of occupation by the French and the seven and a half years of war. Most neutral observers did not believe that the two nations could co-operate after independence. Nevertheless, Algeria has chosen the way of forgiveness and tolerance, silencing resentment, drying her tears, and extending the hand of co-operation, in spite of the presence of French army bases, which, thank God, are no longer here to trouble us. In spite of the atomic experiments which were carried out on our soil, we were flexible at a time when we had every right to be firm; and no incidents arose between our army and the French forces, which the war of liberation, over so many years, had inevitably kept on opposite sides.
Our people have never avenged themselves on the French forces, although there is not a single Algerian family which has not been a victim of this army... This was the policy we followed and shall continue to follow. Most of our problems have been solved. The financial controversy has been settled; but other problems are still outstanding.

As everyone knows, France has interests in Algeria, and vice versa. But perhaps one of the main French interests, the value of which is difficult to estimate, is the fact—historically unique—that our country has deliberately turned the page of history and overcome its bitterness. The French people themselves, who suffered less severely from the Nazi occupation than we did from colonialism, were unable to achieve a genuine rapprochement with the Germans until recent years.

The French have considerable interests in Algeria, such as power supplies, since most of France’s consumption is imported from Algeria. These interests bring in enormous dividends. Similarly, we have interests in France, where there are a large number of Algerian workers, in addition to the technical and cultural assistance granted as a result of Algeria’s situation immediately after the colonial period...

In the last few years, at the very time when we were engaged in organising our economy and our financial affairs, establishing a national industry, educating our children, and just when we were absorbed with the problems of assisting the disabled, the widows, and the orphans of war, as well as the casualties which still occur in the mine-fields, an ordinance was adopted in France forbidding the importation of Algerian wines.

I have already had occasion recently to reveal that 300 million gallons of wine are being stored in our cellars as a result of the French decision, which was taken after demonstrations by French vine-growers. Prohibiting the importation into France of Algerian wines means that the Algerian fellah is paying for the advantages granted to French peasants. It also means that more than 70,000 million [old] francs have been frozen, in spite of the agreements signed.

We have a right to ask the following questions:
— Does not such a measure, taken in such circumstances, seriously prejudice the Algerian economy?
— Does the fact that Algerian wines are not allowed on the French market serve the interests of Franco-Algerian co-operation?

The financial setback has certainly produced considerable side-effects and the French decision would have had disastrous consequences for the national economy if we had not taken the stern measures required. I refer to this problem because this was an agreement between the two countries—Algeria and France—and because wine production was a result of colonisation.

For us co-operation means respecting mutual interests. It must not depend on the state of mind of certain groups in one of the countries concerned. It is inconceivable that the Algerian fellahin should bear the cost of the discontent of some French peasants. We cannot accept such a situation, since our fellahin also expect to enjoy the fruits of their labours. In addition, ours is a poor country and has not the same resources as France. Therefore the wine...
problem involves an obligation to respect the agreement signed between our two countries...

We were able to free this land, however impossible this may have seemed. We were also able to fill the gap and to establish the state in spite of attempts by the O.A.S. to destroy the country. We were able to establish a basis for our economy in spite of the hurried departure of French officials. We must therefore be as successful in this field as we have been elsewhere. We demand that co-operation should be based on clearly defined principles and on mutual respect for the higher interests of each country.

There is another, equally important, problem—the recent decision to limit the number of Algerians allowed to enter France. This decision was taken when negotiations were in progress on this problem. France has a right to refuse to admit Algerian workers, just as Algeria has a right to nationalise companies. But the problem of Algerian labour was the subject of an agreement signed in 1964; we had asked for this to be revised and negotiations were under way. We were therefore surprised by the French Government's decision to limit the number of Algerian workers allowed into France. All this leads to a clear-cut conclusion—that revolutionary readjustment is needed, similar to that made by the movement of 19 June.

During the last three years the word 'aid' has been banished from our vocabulary. Why? Because it has become clear that our predecessors were unaware that no country grants aid to another without expecting anything in return, unless it is dependent on the other. That is why we have refused aid from all countries. We have described our relationship with France as Franco-Algerian co-operation based on the mutual interest of the two nations. This leads us to say that at present co-operation has not gone very far, since it is not based on mutual interests.

We take this opportunity to re-assert our determination to refuse any co-operation which leads to exploitation, by France, or by our friends in the east or elsewhere. In fact, as we approach the sixth anniversary of our independence you can take pride in the fact that your country owes not a cent to any country. And, if anyone contradicts you, you can proudly reply: 'Show us your proof if you are sincere.'

This certainly does not mean that we want to withdraw into ourselves, since we are an integral part of the human race, which is precisely why we want to develop and to work in co-operation with mankind. However, we do not believe in the virtues of charity.

A Programme for Action

I have just given a summary of our achievements during the last three years. There is no need at this juncture to refer to Algeria's attitude to the freedom movements in Africa, Latin America, and Asia—especially the Vietnamese cause, whose justice is self-evident to us. The Americans, who created this problem, are interventionists and colonialists. Let them go home and leave Vietnam to the Vietnamese.

I should like to refer briefly to this year's programme for action. This includes the reorganisation of the party and the départements, the liquidation
of large estates where exploitation has taken place, and the development of \textit{autogestion}, with fuller legal powers to apply it in agriculture.

There is also the vitally important question of educational reform; we shall carry out a veritable revolution at all levels in order to adapt our educational system to the nation’s personality and to the requirements of our society.

We must also reinforce the controls over the machinery of government, especially economic enterprises, and put into practice the decision to introduce national service. This will have a considerable effect on the progress of our revolution, since for the first time we shall be mobilising the potential forces of youth to achieve national aims in defence and socio-economic development.

For the first time, fellahin, workers, students, and teachers will be living and working side by side. It is possible that, during the first year, only some of our young people will take part in this experiment. But, during the years to come, it will involve tens of thousands of young people, who can be mobilised to build the nation and strengthen our Revolution. Since the generations before 1962 gave their life-blood for independence, the present and future generations must offer their share of sweat and toil.

This vast programme will require all our concentration and energies until 1969, when permanent national institutions will be established. This will be the culmination of the initial stage in the liberating struggle to realise our revolutionary aims. It will also be the beginning of a new stage, and new prospects for the future of our people, our nation, and our Revolution. The achievement of these aims depends on the efforts of all Algerians... This will be the victory of our Revolution, the Revolution of the working masses, the Revolution of 1 November 1954.

Glory to our Revolution. Forward!